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28 December 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

COMMUNIST PARTY FACTIONS' PAPERS ENGAGE IN MUTUAL ATTACK

Stalinist Paper Sees Power Grab

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 30 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Fateful Decisions"]

[Text] The eight district organizations of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] that publish TIEDONANTAJA presented the SKP Central Committee, which met over the weekend, with a proposal for the democratic preparation and realization of an extraordinary congress on party unity.

The SKP district organizations proposed the start of serious discussions to halt the disintegration which threatens the party, to retract administrative decisions already made, and to bring about the shift toward establishment of an effective and internationalist communist party, more influential than the present one, in our country.

The SKP Central Committee--which, as everyone knows, represents only a section of the party--under the leadership of Aalto and Aitamurto ignored the constructive proposals of the district organizations which publish TIEDONANTAJA. They were not even brought up for discussion.

On the contrary, the SKP leadership made a number of new decisions which demonstrate indifference toward drawing conclusions about the political situation after the municipal elections and, above all, toward the fate of the SKP.

The Central Committee decided to urge parallel activity in the Uusimaa and Turku district organizations and in the areas of other district organizations which publish TIEDONANTAJA. All this was done, of course, in violation of SKP bylaws. The Kainuu district organization's secretary, who supported progress toward SKP unity, was also dismissed on the recommendation of Aalto and Aitamurto.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn about the Central Committee meeting over the weekend: Aalto and Aitamurto are deliberately breaking up the SKP.

Whereas Aalto and Aitamurto stubbornly opposed convening an extraordinary congress just a while back, now their goal is to use the congress as an instrument

in their disruptive activities. And in order for it to be possible to force acceptance of the decisions pertaining to this at the congress, Aalto and Aitamurto secure their positions by measures which violate SKP bylaws in order to prevent fulfillment of the membership's actual wish.

And Aalto and Aitamurto do all this fully conscious of the fact that the eight SKP district organizations which proposed convening an extraordinary congress will not let their initiative be used for a disruptive meeting.

The SKP's Tampere district organization has already informed the SKP leadership that its representatives will not participate in any extraordinary congress in which parallel district organizations with disruptive aims are represented.

Majority Paper on TIEDONANTAJA Reporting

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 31 Oct 84 p 3

[Editorial by Oiva Bjorkbacka: "TIEDONANTAJA and the SKP Central Committee"]

[Text] In its Tuesday issue TIEDONANTAJA has again enlightened its readers by explaining what the SKP Central Committee has supposedly decided. In its former style the factional publication, which takes pains to disrupt the party, strives once more to turn matters upside down.

Whereas the Central Committee decides that an extraordinary congress will be convened in conformity with party bylaws in order to approve measures for restoring the party's authentic unity, the newspaper tells its readers that "the SKP leadership made a number of new decisions which demonstrate indifference toward drawing conclusions about the political situation after the municipal elections and, above all, toward the fate of the SKP."

The Central Committee's decision is published in its entirety in KANSAN UUTISET. It was furnished to this newspaper as well as TIEDONANTAJA immediately after the meeting.

What kind of indifference is at issue when the central committee specifically emphasizes: "The SKP needs active and authentic unity. This is the precondition for the important political tasks ahead. Our country's conservative policy has meant stagnation and decline for society. The entire intellectual atmosphere is marked more and more clearly by middle-class character and the views which accompany it. This was also reflected in the municipal elections."

With regard to the municipal elections, the Central Committee unanimously approved a standpoint which we publish elsewhere. The Central Committee stated in its evaluation of the municipal elections that the election outcome showed "that outside the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] electoral alliance, there is neither living space nor support for a faction which severs connections with the People's Democratic movement."

According to the Central Committee, genuine unity and party democracy consist of the collective discussion, preparation and treatment of issues and the joint implementation of decisions resulting from them. "The achievement of party

goals--not factional interests--is most important to all members. The Central Committee calls on every district organization to establish this kind of unity. To achieve it, the Central Committee considers it useful for each district committee--before the next central committee--to arrange a district committee meeting where implementation of the course of action and the decisions of the 20th Congress, the establishment of authentic party unity and preparations for an extraordinary congress will be discussed.

This Central Committee resolution reflects anything but indifference toward the party's fate. One could justifiably accuse of indifference those who at the 20th Congress refused to participate in leadership tasks in a spirit consistent with resolutions and bylaws.

Obviously on the basis of TIEDONANTAJA sources, Tuesday's UUSI SUOMI also dealt with the Central Committee's decisions. Misled by its sources, UUSI SUOMI made the mistake of conveying a completely erroneous picture of--among other things--the Central Committee's reply to the CPSU Politburo's letter. The reply's basic idea is contained in the communique given at the meeting, in which it is stated:

"The SKP Central Committee made itself thoroughly familiar with the message of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and approved the reply to it.

"The SKP Central Committee's reply is based on party-policy resolutions of the 20th Congress and the Central Committee. Especially emphasized in the reply is the significance of fraternal collaboration between the SKP and the CPSU for the development of relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and for the common struggle on behalf of peace, detente and disarmament."

Moderate Leaders Attacked

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 1 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Response of the Party People"]

[Text] If some SKP members have believed up until now that the steadfast and deliberate intent of the conservative steering group of Arvo Aalto and Aarno Aitamurto was not the dissolution of the party, then the Central Committee's most recent resolutions should have made the matter clear.

In violation of SKP bylaws, the Central Committee decided to urge parallel activity in the Turku and Uusimaa district organizations and in the areas of other district organizations which publish TIEDONANTAJA and to dismiss the Kainuu district secretary. Also contained in the resolutions was a decision--kept secret and disclosed today by our newspaper--to establish parallel party divisions for residential areas and workplaces alongside the regular divisions, to transfer party members into these parallel divisions, to turn over membership dues directly to the Central Committee and thus bypass the district organizations which support unity, as well as to grant membership cards without regard for the district organizations.

The steering group wraps its affairs--which violate the bylaws and standards for party life of even the most primitive Leninists--in the fictitious cloak of "returning to bylaws" and "achieving genuine unity."

The Central Committee also decided to send a letter in reply to the CPSU's message, in which deep concern about the recent development in the SKP was expressed. As far as we know, the letter of reply is not the kind of answer which could be expected from responsible party leadership. That is why it is all the more important to see that the actual response of the SKP's current leadership was in practice to provoke disruptive activity. Aalto and his friends respond to the concern felt by the CPSU and other fraternal parties in the only way they can and want to.

The measures by the party's conservative steering group reveal fear of the membership and aim at disregarding its wish. The membership is led astray by pseudoleftist phrases, intimidated into remaining passive and beguiled into submitting to a crushing power.

What is to be done in this situation?

In their proposal the SKP's eight district organizations have laid out the way for stemming dissolution and for a unifying and democratically prepared extraordinary congress. They have also suggested the beginning of negotiations between the central committee and important party groups and all district organizations which have been excluded from its work.

But it would be a major mistake not to see that the membership's activity and expression of opinion are decisive. Only resolute conduct by party people can put a stop to the development which is leading to the collapse and dissolution of the party. Therefore, passivity and waiting around for the results of top-level negotiations are bad.

The wish of the party people is now represented by a central petition for unity. Decisions must now be made in each party collective to speed up the collection of signatures through concrete goals, areas of emphasis and responsible individuals. All reasons for neglecting the petition are empty excuses.

"We know that the overwhelming majority of Finnish communists favor a harmonious, intellectually unified, revolutionary and internationalist party," it was stated in the CPSU's message. The petition for unity must be this kind of performance of the overwhelming majority of communists.

12327
CSO: 3617/19

REPORTED OFFSET TERMS IN AIRCRAFT PURCHASE PROTESTED

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 30 Nov-6 Dec 84 p 16

[Text] According to unconfirmed reports received by our magazine from the United States, the purchase of the majority shares of the "problematic" firm Peiraiki-Patraiki by a U.S. company would be part of the offset package for the purchase of the 40 F-16 aircraft.

It is said that the American side has asked that the agreement not be made public until a way to present this unbelievable fact to Greek public opinion with the minimum of risk has been appropriately studied.

However, regardless of the truth of this information, is something like this really possible? And was this the real meaning and the ultimate purpose of the entire structural settlement or change of the problematic enterprises? If there is no clear denial, we shall assume that the opposition will wish to investigate the subject, because the fact that Greece, unable to produce the needed capital, would auction off Greek exporting firms while allowing U.S. capital in through the window, is of course astonishing!

Let us suppose that this initiative had come from the Peiraiki-Patraiki management that was replaced by Mr Arsenis, which made direct contact with some U.S. industry (multinational or not), and that the negotiations had resulted in a transfer of the majority shares to the foreign company: What would have been the reaction of the Greek authorities? The pro-government press, in large print, would have openly condemned the "export of capital" and the "unprecedented scandal," branding the transaction as a "sell-out to foreign capital" and perhaps demanding that those responsible should be brought to justice.

Or is it, perhaps, that the minister of finance, in the course of his repeated visits to the United States when he failed in his already doomed attempt to attract U.S. investments, decided to come to terms and proceed to acts that toll the bell for the "independent" of a Greek firm?

Is it, therefore, his failure to establish new enterprises with healthy foreign funds and on the basis of precious foreign technology that made him accept the transfer to foreigners of already existing companies?

Let us note, if necessary, that the United States are not the EEC. And if there is a special provision in the Europe of the nine, according to which the mutual purchase or establishment of firms in one of those countries or our own are allowed, the same is not true for the United States.

So, what have you agreed to, Mr Arsenis? What have your terms been and with whom have they been made in the famous "purchase of the century?" It is high time for you to disclose this to public opinion, which is waiting to applaud your negotiating skills as soon as it finds out exactly which nationally advantageous terms you have agreed to with, or through, the firm that manufactures the famous F-16's.

Of course, something similar should also be done in case this information turns out to be correct.

This terribly important issue needs a clear answer:

Because the crushing majority of Greeks are in deed, and not only in words, "nationally proud," and would be unwilling to accept the take-over of important Greek enterprises by foreign capital, regardless of the opportunistic purposes of any given government. Here we are then hoping that there is smoke without fire!

CSO: 3521/110

NATION SEEN ANTI-REAGAN, NOT ANTI-AMERICAN

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 15 Oct 84 p 9

[Article by Thodoros Karzis: "Dangerous Abberations of 'Reaganism'"]

[Text] The prediction was made by many different sources: "They said that if President Reagan is reelected in the American November elections, Washington will harden its position towards Athens".

They were wrong only as far as the timing was concerned. Indeed Washington did "harden" its stand, but before the November elections. The subject that was created in regards to the positions of the Greek government in the matter of shooting down the South Korean jumbo jet and the additional matter that came up from the orgy of violating Greek air space during the NATO maneuver "Display Determination" are two items of irrefutable evidence that the Reagan government cannot control itself in showing its animosity towards Athens.

At this point we must explain once again the self explanatory difference between the American nation and the extreme right government that temporarily is governing it. The so-called by some American government officials "Greek anti-Americanism", is either a wrong political assessment, or (more likely) a deliberate concealment of reality. What does "anti-Americanism" mean? Could it perhaps mean that all Greeks hate all Americans? That, for instance, the Greek government hates Ted Kennedy or Paul Sarbanes and the KKE hates Gus Hall, U.S. Communist Party chief? The truth is that a large majority of Greeks really dislike, not the American nation, nor their sincere American friends, but only those who are trying to subdue and change their country, hiding behind the mask of "alliance" for which this proverb could apply: "With such friends who needs enemies". The extreme right government of Reagan belongs in the latter category. It cannot be identified with America, since governments come and go, exactly as international relations change from time to time.

So there is no "anti-Americanism" in Greece. There is "anti-Reaganism" and it is absolute, irreconcilable, uncompromising. With another government in Washington, or even with another policy by the same government, a relationship of political equality, a respect for the substance of the meaning of "independence", and an unbiased stand in intra-alliance differences, the gentlemen of the CIA who are walking around in our country quickly would start talking about "Greek pro-Americanism" in their reports.

But we have another difference with the Reagan government, that is we Greeks, not the yes-men, the others: we do not see the problem of international peace with the same eye at all.

Of course, today no one ignores that the relations between the two superpowers are at their worst point since 1947, the time of the "cold war" that was just a step away from becoming a hot war. And the question comes up: Why? How is it that even during the period of two American wars, the Korean war and the Vietnam war were American/Soviet relations better than in 1984, a (supposedly) period of peace?

What was this policy? Today, four years after it became effective, no one can say that they do not know about it. It was and continues to be a mad anti-communism of the 1947 variety that has as its target (and a short term target at that!) the disturbance of the nuclear balance in favor of the American side, and a series of aggressive actions at all the international strategic points of support of the Soviet Union with which the stamina of the opponent is being tested, even though there might be a risk of nuclear war, as long as such a war does not exceed the limits of north American sovereignty.

After all this, how can the Greek government with its hard peace loving policy, if this adjective is permitted, with its warm support of denuclearization and with the daring pacifying initiatives of its president be sympathetic to the transatlantic war mongering? How could the latter not side against us with the extreme right dictatorship of Turkey, not only because of the ideological relativity, (yes, ideological relativity, even though there is a democracy in America), but also because of its absolute alignment with the transatlantic commands?

Finally, we have to digest it: as long as there is an extreme right government in America and a socialist government in Greece, Greek/American relations will never become normal. And as we got used to, if we did get used to, living with earthquakes, we will get used to the peculiar idea that two countries that are allied possibly can have strained relations.

Besides, having the precedent of ally Turkey, "what use do we have" of earthquakes?

9346
CSO: 3521/55

OPEN LETTER TO U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 15 Oct 84 p 6

[Text] The American Under Secretary of Defense, Mr Richard Pearl, is coming to our country today, within the framework of a new round of pressures. He will meet with government officials during the next 48 hours.

It is said that he will seek to meet the prime minister himself too, to whom he will convey the American concern about the bases in Greece and from whom he will seek assurances that the "Greek American defense agreement" will be extended beyond the five year period.

Furthermore it is added that Mr Pearl will threaten, indirectly but clearly, the Greek side that otherwise the Pentagon will start its planning immediately to take away its bases and transfer them to Turkey.

Naturally, we do not know how much truth there is in these rumors. Because in any case, however, Mr Pearl (as almost all the American officials) is a good American, but a bad ally, in contrast to us who have always been good allies, but bad Greeks, we would like to bring to his attention some simple (and trans-allied) truths:

Mr Pearl,

As a good American you worry about the future of your bases in Greece. As you know very well, however, all bipartite relationships and alliances are based on the principle of mutuality. Of course, when this mutuality is being sought and kept between a giant (such as your country) and a sward (like our country) it amounts to at least a futile effort.

Indeed Mr Pearl, what kind of mutuality can exist between the U.S. and Greece? You have bases in Greece by agreement and they are nuclear bases. Shall we install military bases in America too, on the basis of mutuality?

You have your propagandistic "voice" here in Greece. Shall we install propaganda stations in the U.S. on the basis of mutuality?

Here you have your extraterritoriality that makes you almost completely immune. What meaning would extraterritoriality for us have in your country when our presence in Washington is restricted to our diplomatic representation?

Here you have your own stores filled with goods that you bring from your country. Shall we also establish stores in the U.S. on the basis of mutuality, but who would shop there?

Here you have your fleet that anchors in Faleron or Souda whenever it wants to. What fleet can we also send to Norfolk or Newport News on the basis of mutuality?

Mr Under Secretary,

If, in spite of all this, Greece does not have fleets or nuclear weapons to send, on the basis of mutuality, to your lands and seas, it may claim mutuality from you on the subject of Cyprus and the Aegean.

Because, if you as a good American are right in worrying about what will happen to your bases in Greece, we as Greeks are right in worrying about Cyprus and the Aegean.

Indeed, when you have not fulfilled any allied obligation in Cyprus for 10 entire years and as far as the Aegean is concerned, when you believe what Mr Sofli does, that the "crisis is due to unusual geographic arrangements in the past".

For this reason, no matter how much you apply pressure Mr Pearl do not deceive yourself. The tragedy in Cyprus and the threat in the Aegean will make the bases in Greece more undesirable and more hostile every day. Shall we hope that as a good American you will convey this fact to Washington?

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CSO: 3521/55

YUGOSLAV MANIFESTO ON 'MACEDONIAN MINORITY' SEEN 'PROVOCATION'

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28-29 Nov 84 p 1

[Text] Belgrade and Skoplje devised a most serious provocation against Greece concerning the so-called and substantially non-existent "Macedonian minority" in our country, while the Greek government still remains idle, despite the fact that whenever a similar subject arose in the past, the Greek reaction was immediate, expressing the official positions of all the political parties of Greece.

Specifically, early last week, the official Yugoslav federated news agency TANYUG followed by Skoplje radio station in its Greek broadcast, referred to the manifest that was published supposedly in Greece, according to which a "secret organization with headquarters in Thessaloniki, targetted to fight for the national and human rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece" was introduced in our country.

The manifest of the "secret organization" made up of two pages claims to have originated in Thessaloniki and was distributed last month to the Greek newspapers. The interesting fact of this manifest is that it concentrates its criticisms against Greece exclusively and does not extend them against Bulgaria as is done usually in the matter of the non-existent "Macedonian minority" that continuously arouse Skoplje and the slavomacedonian organizations of Canada and Australia.

Qualified observers emphasized yesterday that the importance of the manifest in itself is restricted or unimportant since, beyond the differentiation that was described above, similar texts are being printed abroad, circulate in Greece and as a rule are being mailed to newspapers.

Nevertheless, as the observers themselves noted, what is not acceptable in the recent developments is due to the fact that the official newspaper of Yugoslavia, the newspaper of Skoplje NOVA MAKEDONIA and the radio station of the "Socialist Democracy of Macedonia" published and relayed the content of the manifest.

9346
CSO: 3521/55

POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES OF ND, PASOK MEMBERS DISCUSSED

Athens | VRADYNI in Greek 25 Sep 84 p 9

/Second in a series of articles by Titos Athanasiades/

/Text/ The subject of intraparty democracy as reflected in a free dialogue, the presentation of different views, and the views of the majority prevailing in the end, is of particular importance, because only in this way can parties with a broad ideological and political base survive.

The variety of views in a party comes from different tendencies around issues of strategy and tactics, as well as ideology and political philosophy, without, of course, questioning the dominant ideology. Yet, there is also one other criterion for such varying intraparty views: the historic or traditional.

The tendencies developing in the ranks of the New Democracy and PASOK are due to two criteria: traditional and ideological (without such differences signifying opposition to the party's prevailing ideology).

It is a fact that we cannot talk about organized opposition forces either with ND or PASOK.

In any event, in ND it is clear the leadership respects the right of cadres and members of the parliamentary group and the party to criticize as shown by the recent speeches of deputies Tzannetakis and Kondoyianopoulos at the latest meeting of the Parliamentary Group prior to Averof's resignation from the party leadership; or by the speeches of deputies and former ministers Palaiokrasas, Evert, Dimas, and former minister Manos who were seeking a renewal of the party and a certain revamping of its ideology.

By contrast, in the case of PASOK the price to pay was heavy for those who dared to criticize. The entire Democratic Defence with cadres such as Karagiorgos, Filias, Notaras, Konstandopoulos and others, was thrown out of PASOK, not to mention the more recent expulsion of deputies who dared to voice criticism such as Panagoulis, Petsos, Bouloukos, Khondrokoukis, Kargopoulos and others--in spite of declarations contained in the PASOK charter.

According to the historical-traditional criterion we find two tendencies in ND: conservative and centrist. The conservatives come from the unadulterated Right (T. Varvitsiotis, A. Papadongonas, A. Balkos, A. Tsaldaris, N. Gelestathis and others) and the reformist wing (G. Rallis, K. Stefanopoulos, I. Palaiokrasas, A. Andrianopoulos, T. Tzannetakis and others).

The Centrists come from two historic openings of the Right toward the Center, prior to the dictatorship (E. Averof, I. Boutos) and after the dictatorship (K. Mitsotakis, Athan. Kanellopoulos, Mikh. Papakonstandinou, Sot. Papapolitis, Sot. Kouvelos and others).

Radicals and Neoliberals

According to the ideological criterion, we find two tendencies within ND: radical liberalism and neoliberalism. Radical liberalism is the party's official ideology as expressed at the First Congress of Khalkidiki, in 1978, by the party's founder Kon. Karamanlis. Neoliberalism is a sort of ideological heresy (it has no relation whatever to the title of Mitsotakis' party prior to his joining ND). The development of this theory and the movement of neoliberalism in ND took place after the withdrawal of Karamanlis from the party and his election as president of the Republic.

The differences between radical liberalism and neoliberalism are not too important. Radical liberalism "/the government/ must intervene to balance economic and social cleavages, limit inequities and complement private initiative when economic and social reasons require government action"--as Karamanlis did /as premier/.

This theory places those who accept it in an area between traditional conservatism and West European Social Democracy. It favors private initiative but also extensive government intervention in the economic and social sector to smooth the cleavages and reduce the inequities existing in society.

Most ND cadres support radical liberalism regardless of their place in the party according to their historical/traditional origin. This theory is expressed mainly by G. Rallis, K. Stefanopoulos, A. Kanellopoulos, G. Boutos, I. Varvitsiotis, M. Evert, and S. Dimas.

Neoliberalism is basically in favor of complete freedom for private initiative and the market place. This, of course, does not mean a return to the traditional liberalism of Adam Smith. It simply states that state intervention (statism) in production has expanded too much and calls for an end to it and for a gradual de-nationalization of public enterprises when appropriate.

Several ND cadres such as I. Palaiokrasas, A. Andrianopoulos, S. Manos, K. Giatrakos and others have spoken in support of neoliberalism. The Neoliberals cooperate closely with the Center for Political Research and Training which belongs to ND and is directed by I. Loulis.

In PASOK we find two tendencies in terms of the historical criterion and three according to the ideological. With regard to the first we find the leftist tendency of those who come from the traditional Left as developed during the Nazi occupation and in the years before the dictatorship; and those who come from the traditional Center.

In the traditional Left we find some individuals who were active during the occupation in the National Liberation Front such as A. Lazaris, N. Athanasopoulos, E. Alexandris, I. Skoulikis, P. Avgerinos, S. Tsaparas, and others. Among the traditional centrists we find I. Alevras, S. Akrita, E. Giannopoulos, Sp. Rallis, A. Sekhiotis, I. Kharalambopoulos, G. Papadimitriou and others.

According to the ideological criterion the tendencies developing in PASOK are: a purely Marxist, a radical socialist (Third World) and a social-democratic.

In the first group (which would like a regime akin to the peoples' democracies) we find the ministers A. Tsokhatzopoulos, G. Gennimatas, Lianis, Kaklamanaki, and the deputies I. Pottakis, A. Tritsis, St. Tzoumaka, M. Khatzinakis, M. Gikonoglou, E. Lambraki, D. Vounatsos, and the party cadres Vaso Papandreou, Rokkos and others.

The group which espouses a Third World radical socialism includes Andreas Papandreou, the ministers A. Lazaris, I. Skoulikis, K. Papoulias, Ger. Arsenis, S. Valyrakis, K. Aslanis, I. Papadomarkakis, Kypriotaki, V. Intzes, S. Giotas, Th. Pangalos, the deputies G. Ktenas, Th. Loulis, and others.

In favor of a West European type of social democracy are ministers K. Simitis, Melina Merkouri, E. Veryvakis, E. Giannopoulos, E. Kouloumbis, A. Drosogiannis, and the deputies Amalia Fleming, Sp. Rallis, Dion. Boulokos, S. Anastasakos and others.

The prevailing ideology in PASOK is that of socialism which holds that the means of production belong to society while compensation is determined by one's work not by his needs as is the case in communism. But in PASOK's socialism we find certain differences relating to the strategy and tactics leading to it. Papandreou, being at this point a consistent Marxist with regard to the method of analysis and interpretation of social phenomena (in this respect PASOK is a Marxist party), follows Lenin's dictum that "there are many roads to socialism."

The PASOK leader follows his own road to socialism--which he calls "parliamentary" in the sense that by using the structures of parliamentary democracy he hopes to gain time so that in a first stage he will be able to undermine and eliminate them and then proceed to replace them with the socialist institutions. Self-management and socialization play an important

role in this process which will pass into its decisive phase by the change of the country's constitution. Because the change is one of PASOK's intentions and Papandreu will do it when conditions are right, in order to speed up and legitimize the "socialist transformation."

The maneuvers to gain time until PASOK is able to impose its form of socialism became evident immediately after the 1974 election.

In the first electoral contest after the dictatorship, PASOK aired extreme slogans, not only in foreign policy ("out of NATO," "EEC and NATO the same syndicate"), but also in domestic affairs with young adherents shouting "on the eighteenth (November) socialism." But after the disappointment of that election in which PASOK received only 13 percent, it gradually toned down its extremism and put on a more moderate mask to increase its following and stabilize its course toward power.

7520
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KAPSIS ALLEGED UNDERHANDED MANEUVERS; DIPLOMATIC SERVICE BILL

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 18 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr G. Kapsis, now is playing the Tsokhatzopoulos card in a desperate attempt to "regain some prestige", a movement that turns against everything: minister Mr Kharalambopoulos (whom he undermines systematically), the substitute minister Mr K. Papoulias (whom he does not forgive for taking away some of his responsibilities), the diplomatic counsel of the prime minister, Mr Makairitsa (with whom he is competing for the favors of Mr Papandreu).

Mr Kapsis' initiative without the knowledge of Mr Kharalambopoulos who is absent in New York, placed prime minister aide Mr Akis (Tzokhatzopoulos) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking over the vacant office that had been occupied before "allagi" [Change] by the general secretary of the ministry. Another three offices were occupied by his "staffers". Mr Kapsis' maneuver has a journalistic clarity: by selling services to the first dolphin of PASOK, he secures support in the party mechanism and even a sympathetic access to the prime minister. At the same time, he hits directly Mr Kharalambopoulos whose relations with Akis are not good because of the vice presidency.

The former small time politician tries to reinforce himself even with the sudden promotion, also it appears without the knowledge of Mr Kharalambopoulos, of a bill that provides for the establishment of two new independent services that formally will be under the ministry of Foreign Affairs, but independently will perform the responsibility of briefing everyone abroad on national matters, as well as of studying, promoting and supporting etc. Greek interests in subjects of foreign policy.

The dangers that hide behind such an effort are evident.

The splitting of the singleness of the government representation. From then on Greece will be talking abroad with two voices: One will be that of the experienced technocrats and the other of amateurs and irresponsible appointees, ready to sacrifice everything for any temporary party or other interest.

Our country will fall in disrepute since these paradiplomatic services will not, of course, be in a position to conduct such a delicate and sensitive foreign representation of the country.

Of all the throes suffered by the ministry of Foreign Affairs during "Allagi", perhaps this bill is the worse. This is not surprising when you consider who inspired it!

The submitted bill provides for the introduction in the ministry of Foreign Affairs of a new independent briefing service "for the promotion of the Greek positions abroad and domestically".

The service is manned luxuriously with a chief having a grade 2 slot for special positions (not diplomatic) that is equal with that of General Secretary, in other words, higher than the grade of a career ambassador, with 12 positions of special counsels and with ten positions of public employees. Complete vagueness predominates regarding the qualifications for all of these positions, their grade development as well as their salary levels. The only certain thing is that their hiring will be done arbitrarily by appointment or by detachment.

Copying Libya

The parliamentary committee for foreign affairs voted yesterday, only by the PASOK side, for a bill "for a briefing service for the ministry of Foreign Affairs".

The speaker for the ND [New Democracy], Mr K. Giatrakos, emphasized that the bill proves what the concept of PASOK is on how and who should be exercising foreign policy. And naturally not by trustworthy diplomats, but by appointed amateurs whose main characteristic is their party and political orientation. The two new independent services with independent duties, Mr Giatrakos continued, is a peculiar inspiration and does not differ very much from the diplomatic offices of Qaddafi.

The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr I. Kapsis, during a talk with the parliamentary authors, supported that this service is indispensable to cover the void of promoting our national matters. It will be an executive tool and will not interfere with the duties of other services. It will be supported by experts, academicians and other specialists.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

BILL ON ARMS POSSESSION--The bill providing for licenses to carry firearms for the citizens is ready. The position of the government on this subject is generally negative, because it believes that the security of the citizens can and should be secured by the government itself. For this reason the conditions for issuing licenses are becoming stricter. This was stated yesterday by the minister of Public Order, Giannis Skoularikis, during his regular meeting with reporters. [Text] [Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 24 Oct 84 p 4] 9346

CSO: 3521/55

COMMENTS, OPINIONS ON PINTASILGO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

'Irreversible' Candidacy

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 18 Oct 84 p 9

[Article by Carlos Pires and Jorge Nuno Oliveira]

[Excerpt] "Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy is irreversible, although we have not yet decided when to make it official." That is what TEMPO was told by engineer Antonio Brotas, one of those chiefly responsible for setting the former head of government's election team in motion.

Antonio Brotas is an engineer in quantum mechanics and a professor at the Higher Technical Institute. "For the time being," he is acting as "coordinator of regional contacts."

His job is to conduct "tests" to see how well Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's image has penetrated specific groups: villages, universities, district capitals, and firms.

Antonio Brotas says: "The tests we have been running have been encouraging. We went to one village and left two lists to be filled in by supporters of her candidacy, and when we returned 2 days later, we found that the lists had been completely filled in."

Antonio Brotas also says that over half of the employees at one firm signed the lists in question.

"The climate we found is encouraging us to advance, and the candidacy is moving ahead," claims Antonio Brotas, who is rejecting, at least for now, a possible role as Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's national representative. "I don't have the qualities of a representative. My work is more technical than political."

Although a member of the Socialist Party, Antonio Brotas does not feel "less Socialist for having endorsed Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy." He adds: "All the more in that there is no incompatibility between one and the other, since candidates in presidential elections are nominated by the citizens, not by the parties, unlike the situation in legislative elections."

Pintasilgo Interview

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 pp 16R-21R

[Interview with presidential candidate Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo by Augusto M. Seabra, Jorge Wemans, Maria Joao Avillez, and Vicente Jorge Silva, in Lisbon; date not specified]

[Excerpts] In a cheerful apartment overlooking the homes of Lisbon, she welcomed us as though both suspicious and eager.

A short time later, as we sat around the dining room table, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo returned once again--as always--to her favorite subject.

In the course of her remarks--and the pleasant and beguiling words seemed at times to be pointing toward the purest utopia--she praised General Ramalho Eanes and the exemplary conduct he has demonstrated during his terms in office. But she nevertheless proposed a more active role for the future president of the republic.

She skillfully took a position above the political parties, emphasizing that they are not democracy's only structures. And she was reticent on the subject of immediate political issues.

But that reticence was broken on the issue of abortion. While professing her identification with the social movements currently underway in Europe, Pintasilgo ended by professing a stand that "is extremely clear and obvious: I oppose abortion!"

But she added: "If I support constitutional and democratic legality, then the laws exist, and I respect them."

EXPRESSO: Will you be a candidate for president?

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo: It is obvious that I accept that possibility. But the decision is in the process of being made. When a definite decision is reached, it will be the result of subjective and objective factors which at this point have not been sufficiently clarified.

EXPRESSO: What do you mean by the clarification of factors that is necessary for making a definite decision?

MLP: I mean the circumstances as a whole--some of which will be simply a matter of subjective assessment--that have to do with my suitability as regards the aspirations being expressed by the various components of society and by specific individuals.

EXPRESSO: Don't you feel that an independent candidate will not meet with a response in voters conditioned by a mental framework imposed on them by the parties?

MLP: As far as I am concerned, qualitative interpretation of the poll results leads me to say that what is at issue is not the greater or lesser degree of recognition enjoyed by public figures: it is not a question of whether A or B is more popular or less popular. The fact that my name appears in first place signifies a choice--or a desire--by the Portuguese to see a candidate who is not part of the party framework.

EXPRESSO: Does that also indicate an antiparty feeling?

MLP: I don't believe you can say there is an antiparty attitude at this point. What does exist in Portuguese life is a degree of skepticism due to the fact that there has been excessive intrusion by political parties at all levels, especially since the constitutional revision of 1982.

Every organization that controls the legal and constitutional functioning of Portuguese life in any way has its source in Parliament. And Parliament, in turn, is controlled by the central party organizations. And we have been witnessing the progressive narrowing down of Portuguese life to a matter of who occupies key positions. Those positions are distributed among people who, if not party members, are at least close to specific parties. With that in mind, it is essential that the Portuguese continue to have a president who is above the parties. This is in no way a disparagement of party activity, which is basic.

President's Position More Than Ethical

EXPRESSO: But in any event, a vote for candidate Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo could be the price the parties would have to pay for their excessive occupation of institutional ground over the past few years.

MLP: First of all, there is no candidate Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo as yet...

EXPRESSO: But one would think there was...

MLP: ...and second, I don't see how, at the present, the parties can be opposed to a candidate who is fundamentally independent.

EXPRESSO: On the other hand, there is the problem of political stability, an argument used by those who feel that the best candidate would be one originating in the parties and therefore having a more stable relationship with them.

MLP: On the contrary. If I do become a candidate, I will do so precisely for the purpose of trying to overcome this constant polarization of Portuguese society. If we analyze the past few years, we see that the polarizing trend is constant: it may be between the Right and the Left, between the center bloc and whatever does not fall within the center bloc, and so on. If I am a candidate, my candidacy will be aimed at finding broad areas of agreement in connection

with the fundamental problems of Portuguese life, which it is up to the president of the republic to emphasize, thus helping in some fashion--as guarantor of the unity of the state--to make those areas of agreement viable and possible for this country's development.

EXPRESSO: In the context of the current Portuguese political system, what specific possibilities for action do you see in the office of the president of the republic? Does that office represent only a moral position situated above the parties--an ethical profile?

MLP: Obviously not. It is, or would be, more than that, although that profile is fundamental. Anyone looking at the presidential election at this moment cannot fail to recognize the enormous prestige enjoyed by the current president of the republic in Portuguese society. And the dominant feature of his conduct is in fact its ethical component. This means that the people see themselves in conduct which places the ethical component above all else and which is in some way the safeguard of the system.

I do not feel, however, that that component exhausts the presidential function, which is extremely important to the future of Portuguese society and requires a very firm commitment. It is necessary to find forms for a national stability which is related to interparty behavior and the possibilities for dialogue among the various parties to resolve major national issues. That stability also has to do with all the other social, cultural, and economic forces which must be called on to participate in a more organic, more continuous, and more sustained manner in all aspects of the conduct of political affairs.

Society Broader Than State

EXPRESSO: Do you feel, then, that the current president's conduct, apart from that ethical component, is inadequate or that it does not meet the need to bring about participation by all those forces?

MLP: I think that General Ramalho Eanes has been doing his job in a perfectly correct and consistent manner in the current context. I think that the conditions have also been created for allowing the president of the republic to stand at the center of what I like to call the social fabric. It is not by chance that the current president is surrounded by fully confident industrialists, intellectuals, trade unionists, heads of self-governing bodies, and others. In other words, there is a social fabric that relies on the president of the republic.

EXPRESSO: But has he been active and specific?

MLP: He has been specific, and to some extent he has been active: he has been building that fabric. I think that the president of the republic has succeeded in making operational a form which is not necessarily institutional--which is not going to be reflected in institutional changes in the superstructure but in confidence and strength on the part of those various social, cultural, economic, and other agents.

EXPRESSO: Outside the parties. Is that the conclusion we should reach or not?

MLP: The parties have definite functions within the state. In the first place, we can call them major organs of the state apparatus whose primary objective is to win power in order--and this is their second objective--to make their own programs possible. In the third place, we can also say that they are schools for civic education--or ought to be. But we cannot think that they fully express the social fabric. Because while they are part of the state, society is also broader than the state.

EXPRESSO: That is one of your themes, is it not?

MLP: It is not just mine: it reflects a new political culture that exists practically everywhere in Europe. It is something like a reflection of the past decade--of the past 5 or 6 years. Let us say that it is something on the order of a demand being made primarily by the generation between 35 and 45 years of age. That generation has experienced the dreams of transforming society and realized that the traditional pattern that was built up in the late 19th and early 20th centuries no longer serves the purpose. But neither are those people served by the revolutionary illuminism characterizing the generation of the 1960's and early 1970's.

On the contrary, the generation in question is proposing a new political culture that is concerned with an economic and social context in which it is not simply a matter of guaranteeing freedoms but in which the fundamental freedoms also depend on the economic and social context--one which is concerned with development plans and which also, and above all, is concerned with taking the technical and scientific process of the past few years into account.

Whether we like it or not, societies have already entered the 21st century. As a result, politics cannot continue to function with the coordinates of the past century. And this--this technical and scientific process--must inform the production and distribution of wealth and the way in which we relate to each other--that is, our social relationships. And this must necessarily be reflected at the level of government. It is important that the parties be capable of capturing those social movements--that profound transformation.

Nonprofessional Politics

EXPRESSO: Intrinsically, that transformation presupposes that as far as representing the citizens is concerned, the exclusiveness of the parties must be somewhat reduced. Because of that, your candidacy may not be antiparty, but it may be against the parties. That explains why there has been some reaction by the parties as evidenced in the various stands that have been taken--by parties ranging from the PS [Socialist Party] to the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and including the PCP--concerning the possibility of your candidacy.

MLP: We cannot judge the behavior of parties and individuals on the basis of isolated and fleeting statements. I want to state clearly that if I decide to be a candidate, my candidacy will certainly not be one of opposition to the

parties. It will be an affirmation that Portuguese life is excessively dominated by political parties. It is necessary not only that the president of the republic be a totally impartial figure standing above the parties and without commitments to the parties--as General Eanes has been during his two terms in office--but also that he stand aloof from that excessive domination by political parties. It is necessary that there be independent and credible candidates capable not only of situating themselves outside the parties but, at the same time, of engaging in dialogue with those parties.

Reordering of Party Political Life

EXPRESSO: In both of his terms in office, despite everything, the current president of the republic has been formally supported by the parties. On the other hand, your possible candidacy is arousing general distrust within the party system. How will a candidate standing above the parties be able to achieve dialogue among the parties and dialogue by all the parties with the other social forces?

In addition, by embodying a certain social logic and a certain new political culture, your possible candidacy would run up against another problem: that social movement would be reflected institutionally only at the highest level in the state, especially since the current Portuguese political system does not allow independent candidates to be elected at other levels all the way down to the municipalities. In a situation like that, wouldn't there be an intensification of institutional conflicts?

MLP: Your question is based on an assumption: that the party framework is immutable. It seems to me that there is a social movement whose outlines are becoming more definite and which is concerned with the importance of all the country's regions, with participation by the citizens in public life, and with the ethical rigor necessary for managing political affairs. There is a social movement of which General Eanes has been, in a sense, the central and rallying figure, and in fact it seems to be turning into a new movement--let us call it a new party. This means that what we are witnessing during these months is a complete reordering of our party political life. And that reordering does not mean just one more party, but a realignment of people--of voters. It also means, I feel--or at least that is what has been coming to light in the press--the addition of new ingredients to party political life.

So the situation is in the process of being transformed from within in keeping with the very logic of party formation, and it will surely contribute, I hope, to that policy of agreement around the end of 1985 or in 1986.

Plan and Regionalization

EXPRESSO: To what new ingredients are you referring?

MLP: I will give you two basic examples. The economic and social forces can only exist and contribute in some manner to this country's development within a framework of clear and permanent rules. According to our Constitution, that framework is the plan. And in our Constitution, the plan is clearly formulated

as far as its structure and objectives are concerned. But Portuguese economic and social life has no plan for economic and social development. Actually, the plan is not really an achievement of the revolution: it is something that we also had before 25 April [1974], although its features back then were somewhat technocratic and included little participation.

Another clear and unambiguous example in the Constitution is regionalization, which appears in all government programs but which has not yet been implemented by any of them. And it is also through regionalization that the country's specific realities can be taken into account. The reason is that when regionalization occurs, it will be the actual groups and individuals in each region that will decide what is fundamental to them.

EXPRESSO: How does the need for the plan fit in with the reality of the market?

MLP: The opposition between plan and market was traditional in a certain era, but today it strikes me as being out of date. When we talk about a plan, we are talking about a framework of major options and guidelines, one that is defined--and our Constitution also draws attention to this--in terms of all those involved in the development process, not solely in technical and "arm-chair" terms. In the second place, it is obvious that the plan today cannot be limited simply to macroeconomic projections, which would be a kind of corset for the economic agents. In terms of programming, today's plan must take new technology into account--and there is no program that can be established once and for all. Therefore, it will not be a rigid and static plan covering a 5-year period, but a plan with a mechanism for institutionalizing the actual changes in its frame of reference.

EXPRESSO: The businessmen are not demanding a plan, however, or more rules, or more goals, or more options, but just the opposite: fewer rules, more openness in the market, and greater facility in allowing things to be done through the very existence of society--through the relationship between supply and demand. Can the plan include all that?

MLP: Absolutely.

EXPRESSO: But the businessmen say no.

MLP: What is the modern plan except a set of rules that all the economic and social agents establish by common agreement with a huge margin of flexibility?

EXPRESSO: A plan of that kind would have to include dismantling a number of the existing administrative regulations that complicate life.

MLP: "Dismantling" is the word you chose, but there is no doubt that a plan designed by modern methods and requiring participation by everyone it affects is something with an entirely different shape. And it will begin to stimulate even greater dynamism on the part of the economic and social agents. At the same time, we must bring about a total revision of the procedures that have been used until now to work up the plan, and that is related to the way in

which we view public administration and the extent to which the latter serves the major policies of the state.

Obstacle to Development

EXPRESSO: In your opinion, then, what is the major obstacle to the development of Portuguese society?

MLP: In the first place, it is the fact that development is not included in the government's political programs, where it appears only as one element in government action. But for development to be possible in a given society, it must inform all aspects of government action, including those that we traditionally regard as politicoadministrative: regionalization, the upgrading of local government and its responsibilities, the reform of public administration, and intervention by nongovernmental bodies, for example. But development also involves coordinates or sectors that are not exclusively economic in nature. Those have to do with all sectors of public activity that the government has the duty to administer. And so far, this has not in fact existed--or has existed as a rare exception--in Portuguese programs for government since 25 April.

EXPRESSO: Does the chief obstacle to development have anything to do with mentalities?

MLP: Absolutely.

EXPRESSO: According to politicoeconomic talk--the talk by finance ministers--the chief obstacle to the development of Portuguese society is foreign indebtedness and the difficulties in finding the funds needed for development.

MLP: It is obvious that there cannot be development when financial problems are added to economic problems. In saying that, I feel that I am saying everything there is to say on the subject. But the economic aspect is not isolated, either. It does not seem to me that there can be development without that transformation of mentalities--without an extremely clear and constantly strengthened and developed cultural matrix.

IMF and Portugal

EXPRESSO: Was the agreement that was reached with the IMF in August of last year an act against development?

MLP: Certainly.

EXPRESSO: But what would have happened without the agreement with the IMF? Where are we going to get the money to buy groceries?

MLP: Today we are getting money to buy groceries in the certainty that within a few months there won't be enough to buy bread. That is the inescapable problem with the spiral of foreign debt. And that, I want to say very clearly, is a conviction now shared by several political leaders in the world: a conviction

that foreign debt, and especially loans from the IMF, can place countries in a situation of dependence, as is true in Portugal's case. But why? The IMF is an organization at the disposal of states belonging to the United Nations and the fund's member states. It must be remembered that the fund--this is explicit in its basic charter--is required to go along with the economic and social development plans of the countries asking to borrow from it. So the question is: what conditions do the countries accept and what development projects are they proposing?

What I am saying is not utopian. It is part of the final communique issued last May by an organization to which I belong: the Interaction Council of Former Heads of Government. Under the guidance of former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, we stated clearly in that communique that it must be recognized that the IMF has helped some countries temporarily overcome situations placing them on the brink of catastrophe, but also that its terms must in no way run counter to national sovereignty. In the second place, there exists a situation approaching a break between the IMF and some debtor countries in Latin America that no one can accuse of being revolutionary--examples being Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and others. What are they asking for? In that final communique from the Interaction Council of Former Heads of Government, we commented on that very thing: they are asking for a rescheduling of their debt, which is essential, and possibly even the establishment of a ceiling for the servicing of debt in their national budgets.

This means that we could not be paying off the interest on debt in such a way that doing so would take more than our earnings from exports. Otherwise, we would be working for nothing or only to enrich countries that are already rich.

Renegotiate Foreign Debt

EXPRESSO: Nevertheless, it was in fact those rich countries that lent the money. Ethics must also be involved in the loan contract. Wouldn't it be unethical to break the contract?

MLP: I was not talking about breaking it. What we drew attention to at that meeting by former heads of government, and the thing that seems basic to me, is that to guarantee national independence, Portugal and the next president of the republic cannot avoid making an attempt at dialogue with all the political forces so that we can renegotiate the debt. That means a new timetable for payment, the establishment of an annual ceiling on debt service, and possibly other terms as well. Perhaps it will not necessarily come up in our case, but as is known, some countries are suggesting that the debt relative to a specific period be purely and simply forgiven and that from that point on, they begin working only with new debt totals. You mentioned the ethical problem with the rich countries. I believe there is a dichotomy in that area that cannot be maintained today in the international monetary system. The problem of foreign debt today is a problem for debtors and creditors alike. The creditors have an interest in revising the conditions under which foreign debt is currently being handled.

EEC: "Inadmissible" Philosophy

EXPRESSO: There is one issue in terms of the future which seems relatively near at hand for the Portuguese: membership in the EEC. Are you in favor of integration? And what are its possibilities?

MLP: The process is underway, and I consider it natural that Portugal should join the EEC. But I would like to talk about the limits of that membership. It is obvious that the timetables as announced contain something that surprises me in that it has not caused a reaction by us all--by the citizens and especially the people in the media. For example, it is said that everything is well underway and that the only things left to discuss are the common agricultural policy and the budget. But in fact, those are practically the only two major elements within the European Economic Community.

I must necessarily mention the way in which the process of joining the EEC has appeared in the programs and practice of Portuguese governments. While I consider, on the one hand, that membership is important to Portuguese life, both in real and in symbolic terms, I do not at all agree with the philosophy behind it or with the way in which membership is being negotiated. The philosophy of some Portuguese governments--as though membership were a battle on which our future as a nation depends--is something I consider offensive to our national dignity and inadmissible. Beginning with the second constitutional government, membership in the EEC became a "national purpose"--I am quoting governments--"capable of galvanizing the country." It became a "genuine project of national scope," a "decisive strategic factor," the "priority objective," and the "priority of priorities."

It is with that inflation of its importance--and the verbal inflation as well--that I disagree. Why? Because we are Europeans, and joining the European Economic Community, although presented by several governments as being a political problem, is essentially an economic and social problem. The Community views itself as an economic and social community. But the EEC has not been able to decide on a common policy in the areas of energy, data processing, biotechnology, communications, weapons, education (at one point there was a proposal for a meeting by all the ministers of education, but it was rejected on the grounds that education was up to each country and that there was no need for a common plan), culture, or immigration.

The EEC does not even take a common stand on the major international issues, major conflicts, and major problems affecting the world. There are separate statements from here, there, and everywhere. What is more, it cannot even adopt a common approach to development, as could be seen from the very recent difficulties in renegotiating the Lome Convention with Third-World countries. It seems that my answer is straying from the point of your questions, but it is not. I am placing the issue of membership in the EEC on the level where it belongs, since we do not feel that it is the "great national purpose" or a "great

national project." It requires a certain number of rules, no doubt, in terms of agriculture, in terms also...

EXPRESSO: Of foreign trade...

MLP: ...of foreign trade and industry. Joining will no doubt require a period of transition: an agricultural reorganization which might, on the one hand, act as a stimulus--and I say "might" on purpose--while on the other hand, it will certainly cause situations of extreme difficulty for both sectors. In terms of development in Portugal, I want to debunk the statement frequently made by several rulers throughout several governments to the effect that our social, economic, and even cultural structures will have to be adapted to the EEC. The EEC does not intend that in the slightest degree. So all it involves is a delegation of our sovereignty to others. Development depends on us, not on the EEC.

EXPRESSO: But we are talking about the EEC basically at the level of the Commission of the European Communities and the councils of ministers. There are other institutions, however, such as the European Parliament, which already holds direct elections and takes stands--even if they are in the form of recommendations--on the most varied topics. Is it not true, then, that a degree of "Europeanization" in the broad cultural sense is necessary and essential for Portuguese society?

MLP: No doubt! But I am starting from the assumption that we are in fact a European country and that on all the platforms on which Europe is being built, we must fully assume our position as a European people: on all those platforms without exception and in a manner that is integrated with our foreign policy. This means our presence not only in this process of joining the EEC--and I stress: without subservience--but also a more consistent presence in the Council of Europe, a presence...

EXPRESSO: In NATO?

MLP: There, too, yes, as long as we are able to draw the benefits from our participation in NATO: those of a military nature on the one hand (better equipment and improved training for our Armed Forces), and, on the other, those of a scientific and technological nature which NATO is obliged to give to the member states.

Social Movement and Abortion Issue

EXPRESSO: In Portugal we do not have an ecological and alternative movement of the kind which exists in several European countries and which already has a parliamentary group in the European Parliament. We do not have a strong women's movement or a strong social minority movement. In Portugal, the issue of abortion caused such trauma that even you avoided taking a direct stand on the issue.

Does your failure to take a stand on a burning issue in Portuguese society--abortion--have anything to do with a commitment on your part to the political apparatus?

MLP: I am sorry that you put it to me in that way. Note that we will be falling into mimicry of the Americans if we make such problems as abortion decisive in discussions among people with differing attitudes. In fact, refusal to accept the legitimacy of certain positions strikes me as being a new form of totalitarianism. People seem to forget, particularly as far as I am concerned, that my function in Portuguese society at present--or my professional work, if you will--is that of adviser to the president of the republic. This means that there are a number of matters on which I need not, cannot, and must not express my opinion. For as long as this situation lasts. I say this only to clarify my conduct.

EXPRESSO: But since the fact is that whether you like it or not, abortion is a very hot issue in Portuguese society, you must answer...

MLP: I did answer.

EXPRESSO: There is a lot of ambiguity involved in it, because in relation to other issues, you have no problem expressing yourself. But you do on this issue.

MLP: I have no problem at all.

EXPRESSO: So what is your position?

MLP: It does not strike me as a position that is important at this moment. My position is extremely clear and obvious: I oppose abortion.

EXPRESSO: But do you oppose the law decriminalizing abortion?

MLP: The law was passed. If I defend constitutional and democratic legality, then the laws exist, and I respect them. You have your answer.

Eanist Party and Presidential Candidacy

EXPRESSO: We are currently witnessing the establishment of a political movement identified with General Ramalho Eanes: one to which you assign a very important role in the reordering of Portuguese political life. There are several indications that you would not be the preferred candidate for president of the republic as far as a significant section of Eanism is concerned. What do you think of that?

MLP: I consider that reordering extremely important at this time. I know what is happening as far as that party is concerned: I have been informed. I have no ties with the so-called Eanist party. It is a party which is emerging outside Lisbon, and it has movement of its own. For my part, I am not the kind of person who joins parties. If I were, I would have joined one right after 25 April [1974]. It doesn't fit in with my way of participating in society.

As far as my possible candidacy is concerned, I said a while ago that there were several factors of an objective nature that were important--that cannot be underestimated. I repeat: I feel that an independent and credible candidate is

needed on the Portuguese chessboard. And it is precisely people whom I don't know and whom I would like to know--those in the polls--as well as others who have been with me who feel that I have those characteristics.

I am waiting for the appearance of other candidates who are independent--totally independent of the political parties--and credible. That is an important factor in making a final decision.

EXPRESSO: But what if the CNARPE names another candidate?

MLP: The CNARPE is a party--or will be a party--the Socialist Party is another party, the PSD is another party, and so on.

EXPRESSO: Do you feel that once the CNARPE becomes a party, it will be one more party like any other?

MLP: When I referred to the possibility that the parties would evolve, I emphasized my opinion that the CNARPE has new features--that it has possibilities for being a party with different characteristics--and that for that very reason, it may transform the party political scene. But it will still be a party.

Political Action by MAD

EXPRESSO: A movement with which you are connected--MAD [Movement for Deeper Democracy]--appeared at a given moment as the possible embryo of a new party. Did that question in fact come up?

MLP: No, it never came up within MAD. All of MAD's documents have been issued to the media, and many of them stated clearly what MAD is: a civic-cultural movement favoring social action for change.

EXPRESSO: But there have been discussions and splits within MAD in connection with action by certain groups that are more inclined toward political action.

MLP: There is only one example of that: it occurred at the national plenary meeting in Porto in January, when two individuals specifically brought up the question, not of MAD's becoming a political party, but of its making a choice in the presidential election. And at that time, it was decided that it was too early for MAD, as an action movement, to enter that area.

But there has never been an explicit, clear, and open desire to transform MAD into a political party.

Candidacy and Eanes Support

EXPRESSO: Basically, what leads you to consider the possibility of being a candidate for president of the republic?

MLP: At the moment, I can say that there has been very intensive contact over the past few weeks with Portuguese in various parts of the country--citizens

whom I did not know--who have suggested and insisted that I be a candidate for president.

EXPRESSO: Do you feel that you are in the run-up to the campaign?

MLP: No. On the contrary, my decision will depend to a great extent on the way in which Portuguese citizens express themselves specifically.

EXPRESSO: That is an invitation to express oneself, but only an invitation. What are the clear and unequivocal conditions for your candidacy?

MLP: I thought I had been making them clear throughout this interview.

Right and Left

EXPRESSO: Within the possible range of candidates, and specifically as regards two candidates from the Eanist area, there will be a tendency to classify them according to their position in a more or less definite ideological spectrum. You said somewhere, for example, that you considered the distinction between Left and Right to be out of date. But don't you feel that you are running the risk that your candidacy may be classified as being on the left?

MLP: At this point in Portugal's history, we have a historical inheritance of Right and Left. And within that historical inheritance, I think I am viewed by many people as belonging to the Left. But it seems extremely important to me to emphasize that society's requirements are now such--and not only in Portugal--that the entire mode of thinking and of the new political culture is situated at a level beyond that dichotomy, which is inadequate for explaining all of the reality that exists. Relative to the apparent rigidity on the floor of our Parliament (I say apparent, because it is probably difficult, in historical terms, to determine where the Left is and where the Right is), my position does not fit anywhere in that Parliament. Mine is obviously part of another position that is taking shape in the world.

EXPRESSO: But that is precisely the issue.

MLP: I feel that when you get right down to it, most Portuguese are in that exact position. Their attitude is not one of being on the right or the left. They are experiencing the satisfaction of knowing that basic freedoms have been won, and they are looking for a satisfaction at the level of economic and social conditions and cultural expression that has not yet been achieved.

'Eanist' Opposition

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 pp 1, 24

[Excerpt] Lists for collecting signatures in support of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy have already begun circulating throughout the country, causing tremendous agitation in the Eanist camp. According to what EXPRESSO learned from a source at Belem Palace, the president of the republic has held intensive meetings this week with advisers of his who favor establishment of

the new party. On Tuesday he had dinner with Joao Botequilha, Miguel Caetano, and Jose Rabaca. Several meetings have also been held over the past few days by members of the former CNARPE.

Although little transpired at the meeting between Eanes and Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo that took place on Thursday of last week, it is believed that the president joked with his former prime minister concerning her possible candidacy. Meanwhile, advisers of his have assured us that Ramalho Eanes has no intention of giving his support to Pintasilgo.

One thing is certain: the new steps that are being taken on behalf of her candidacy, particularly the interview published in the "Magazine" section of today's EXPRESSO [the item above], are creating definite confusion in Eanist circles and in the PCP.

Those in charge of launching this new movement claim to be independent and say they want to make a direct test of the former prime minister's popularity. On the other hand, they say they are trying to avoid possible "compromising" support that would identify Lourdes Pintasilgo with "parties on the traditional left." The lists are being signed by "citizens who support engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy for president of the republic and are prepared to subscribe to her official candidacy."

PCP Warns Members

The first public reaction from the Communists came in remarks made in Coimbra by Jaime Serra, who warned the PCP's members that "they must not subscribe to any proposed candidacy." In the same vein, Alvaro Cunhal expressed his opinion in Cova da Piedade by saying that "it is necessary to oppose any haste in putting forward this or that democratic candidate before agreement or consensus has been obtained from the democratic forces or sectors which, by their support and their votes, will be needed to ensure victory."

The Communist leaders, in addition to preferring a military candidate who can unite a broad range of support and control the Armed Forces, seem to be afraid that a phenomenon of populism similar to that generated by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho in 1976 might repeat itself now in connection with the former prime minister.

The partner in the PCP coalition--the MDP-CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement-Democratic Electoral Commission]--has not yet taken a stand on whether to support Pintasilgo. Jose Manuel Tengarrinha has told EXPRESSO that a decision on the matter--specifically on whether to sign the statement of support--will be reached at the meeting by the Political Committee this coming 3 and 4 November.

Reported Melo Antunes Opposition

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 19 Oct 84 pp 2-3

[Article by Caceres Monteiro]

[Excerpt] According to what O JORNAL has learned from well-informed sources, Lieutenant Colonel Melo Antunes has expressed his opposition to Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's possible candidacy for president of the republic.

That stand, which was neither confirmed nor denied by Lieutenant Colonel Melo Antunes when questioned on the subject by O JORNAL, is especially important in that he--a member of the Council of State--has long been a personal friend of the former prime minister, and they frequently have identical political views.

Both are considered to be close to the current president of the republic. Melo Antunes was appointed to the Council of State by Eanes, and Lourdes Pintasilgo is a presidential adviser.

Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy has also been opposed in the past few days by the PCP.

Melo Antunes: "Too Early"

"It is too early to select candidates for the presidential election at the end of 1985." That was what Lieutenant Colonel Melo Antunes told O JORNAL when questioned concerning reports circulating in well-informed political circles that he is not supporting Lourdes Pintasilgo.

Melo Antunes is aware of rumors and hints to that effect, but he emphasizes: "I did not express an opinion, nor was I ever called on to express an opinion, officially or unofficially, concerning that candidacy. I have not been asked either to support or to oppose it. Because of that, I do not have to express an opinion concerning the possible candidacy of engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, Dr Mario Soares, or anybody else. I would do so only if a candidate whom I considered dangerous to the country were to emerge."

According to our sources, the disagreements that have arisen between Melo Antunes and Lourdes Pintasilgo became obvious in a conversation between the two, and those disagreements are based on their differing views concerning the assessment of the political situation and also concerning the profile of the candidate.

Sousa e Castro Active

This disavowal by Melo Antunes is not being backed, however, by other members of the former "group of nine."

Directly across the street from the seat of government and facing the large gate through which Mario Soares--more than a potential presidential candidate--emerges every day, is the place where Major Sousa e Castro works. The chairman

of the Damiao de Gois Institute, an organization intended to support the president of the republic, is an enthusiastic supporter, although only as an individual, of Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy. The "Pintasilgists" consider his help particularly valuable, since, as they emphasize, he has considerable experience resulting from the Eanes campaign.

Sousa e Castro is one of the most active members of the group that is already at work preparing the way for a probable candidacy by Lourdes Pintasilgo, former prime minister and former Portuguese representative at UNESCO.

"Several teams, including one from the press that is coordinated by two reporters (one from radio and one from the daily press) are already at work."

Coming to light this week was a group calling itself an "embryonic committee" for the future national election committee that will support engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy for president of the republic.

Nuno Grande: "Only a Mailbox"

An illustrious personage on that committee is the director of the Biomedical Institute in Porto, Prof Nuno Grande, who is also a member of the MAD Coordinating Committee and of the CNARPE's district committee in Porto.

When questioned by Germano Silva, our correspondent in Porto, Nuno Grande said: "In Porto, I'm only a kind of mailbox for a movement which began in Lisbon and whose purpose is to persuade Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo to be a candidate in the presidential election. There is no official committee for the candidate in Porto at the moment, and I willingly agreed to support that group of citizens whose only intention for now is to create the conditions for dialogue with Lourdes Pintasilgo to persuade her to be a candidate for Belem Palace."

"Large Number of Signatures"

Nuno Grande assured O JORNAL: "There are quite a large number of signatures already." He said that "receptiveness to her possible candidacy is considerable, not only in Porto but in the north in general."

According to the document being circulated for signatures, Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy is based on "total independence from political parties and, beginning now, on simple direct support from the citizens."

Pintasilgo Candidacy: All-Around Evil

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 8

[Commentary by Jose Miguel Judice: "God Is not a Leftist"]

[Text] Politically and as a presidential candidate, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is a product of the public opinion polls. For a year she has been pointed to as the figure most popular with the Portuguese. As an irony of history, just as it became obvious that she would be a presidential candidate, the poll published

this week--the fieldwork for which was carried out the week before the formal announcement of her desire to be a candidate--showed a sharp drop in support, making her a much less desirable possibility than the previous poll results seemed to indicate.

I rather suspect that the support for Pintasilgo is built on a diverse combination of ambiguities that will be cleared up in time and that, in addition, those ambiguities are incompatible with each other. The exposure to sunlight will certainly lead the Portuguese to see the real picture of this politician who so far has passed before the footlights only briefly as the prime minister in what was almost a caretaker government. That exposure will also reveal that she is not just a normal woman with a permanent smile--a symbol of unaggressive femininity who is Catholic, populist, leftist, and likable and who is against communism but not anticommunist. The contradictions will burst into view, and the Portuguese will see that when all is said and done, they have more reasons to reject her than to support her.

I feel, in fact, that Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is an extremely poor candidate for the Portuguese Left, regardless of which version of the Left we want to mention here. In the first place, she is a poor candidate because she has no serious chance of winning, and that is tragic for the Left, regardless of stripe. The president of the republic is doomed to play a tribunial role to some extent, and if the Left loses that, it will begin to lose practically everything, as the PCP realized several years ago. And she has no chance of winning--on that point Cunhal is absolutely correct--because she will never draw moderate voters away from Soares or from a candidate on his right in the second round.

She is a poor candidate, in the second place, because she will represent a vote rejecting the political system, but without the strategic potentialities of the vote rejecting Jardim. The Left's rejection of the present system will mean an irrelevant and sidelined leftism like the late-blooming Christian progressivism that the revolution unintentionally turned into a museum piece. Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is going to put important areas of the Portuguese Left on the sidelines, since defeat will not be the end of her.

In the third place, she is a poor candidate for the Communist Left because she is disorganizing the space controlled by the PCP. The secret behind the strength of Portuguese Communists is to a large extent the strict hierarchical structure they possess, the almost military organization of their political functioning, and the speed of communication (without distortion of the message) between the top leaders and the rank and file. This makes the PCP an uninteresting but very effective party that has been able to capture the political dropouts (those on the sidelines) and to eliminate all the groups in those areas that might compete with the party. Pintasilgo is penetrating that terrain with an ease that terrifies the ossified bureaucrats of orthodox Portuguese Marxism. The PCP likes noncommunist candidates who win with communist votes bought at wholesale. The PCP hates noncommunist candidates who lose with communist votes bought at retail.

In the fourth place, Pintasilgo's candidacy is bad for the Socialist Party, even if Mario Soares seems to be experiencing a moment of great euphoria because of her candidacy. For one thing, she will be a natural winner in the first round (since the PCP is not running its own candidate), so Soares is in danger of not reaching the second round if there is a candidate on his right who, for example, takes all the PSD votes. For another thing, Pintasilgo's defeat will tie up, in movements without a future but with vitality, much of the energy that will be essential for renewing the PS as a leftist party after the victory (or defeat) of Soares in the presidential election. The PS does not like socialist candidates who are unaffiliated and cannot be easily attacked with simplistic anticommunist tirades.

In the fifth place, Pintasilgo is a poor candidate for General Eanes and his future party. One reason is that she is a candidate who restricts, not one who broadens. Another reason is that she will divide Eanism's potential electorate in half and turn it into what everyone will view as a sign of the current president of the republic's lack of power. It will not escape anyone's attention that Ramalho Eanes was unable to stop her from being a candidate, thus revealing his inability to control even his adviser.

How is it that a candidate whom no one wants can manage to be a candidate? That apparent mystery is, when all is said and done, the visible sign of the Portuguese Left's strategic sclerosis. Pintasilgo can be a candidate because there is no credible leftist strategy, no political hegemony on the left, and no politicocultural heritage capable of unifying the diversities of the Portuguese Left. Since no one is in charge of the Left, everyone is in charge. Soares does not allow Cunhal, Cunhal does not authorize Pintasilgo, Eanes does not permit Soares, and Pintasilgo annoys all the others. In a territory marked by anarchy, one can write fine decadent novels and fill a few pages with fanciful spleen, but one cannot accomplish anything politically solid.

The tragedy of the Portuguese Left rests entirely in what Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's presidential candidacy means. But perhaps because of that, the Portuguese Left needs to pass through this provocation and avoid exorcising its ghosts too soon. Perhaps it will be a good thing for the Left in the long run if Pintasilgo moves ahead, even at the possible cost of a victory by a candidate on the right. The commotion that Pintasilgo's candidacy and defeat may cause will probably help the Left change its ways. Being a leftist nowadays is a sore burden in itself for serious and logical people, since reality does not even allow them the security of clinging to their myths. And now a Left that must see itself reflected in the fossilized Cunhal, the rightist Soares, the sphinxlike Eanes, and the ear-to-ear smile of Pintasilgo must be suffering beyond the acceptable limit.

It is a pity that things should be that way. How much better it would be if the Left had liberal and aristocratic communists, frequenters of intellectual salons, cosmopolitan socialists with rimless eyeglasses, soldiers at least wearing beards and a revolutionary look, and progressive Catholic women, tormented but crammed with eschatological wisdom and applications of theology to politics. But Reagan is indeed correct: God cannot be a leftist, otherwise He would have

performed a miracle already. And the worst thing is that although He is not performing a miracle, Pintasilgo is not giving up. Could that be the reason why the Portuguese Left is becoming increasingly anticlerical?

Power of Permanence Doubted

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 27 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's Dream"]

[Text] The candidacy of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, launched a few days ago when signatures began to be gathered in various localities around the country, is indeed troubling.

The question is this: in order to achieve an important position in the state--and particularly the presidency of the Republic--any individual in any part of the world must possess a solid base of support.

This base can be a party, or a significant part of the Armed Forces, or a religious movement, or a group of economic interests. However, there is one characteristic that it must definitely have: stability.

The main reason for this is that the leadership of a nation cannot be entrusted to only one person. In other words, the president must enjoy the permanent support of an influential group that guarantees him or her stability and coherence in carrying out the duties of the presidency.

A chief of state cannot be a person alone.

In the United States, Reagan came to power with the support of a group of interests. In France, Mitterrand did the same with others. The disconcerting fact in Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy is that she seemingly intends to reach the presidency with the sole support of the voters.

Now, if votes are enough to carry someone to the top position in the country, they will never be sufficient to keep the person there.

The reason is that an electorate should not be confused with a group.

One is formed by persons who know each other and are organized with the purpose of defending their interests; the other is constituted by persons who, in addition to not knowing each other, have not defined a common strategy and who do not even exercise, for the most part, any political militancy.

The probable candidate to the presidency will argue that this represents her express will.

In other words: that her objective is to occupy the presidential palace totally free of any commitments so as to build in Portugal a new policy and a new economic order without resorting to political parties, to the military and to economic groups.

However, there are good reasons to believe that this particular way of facing reality is vastly optimistic, to say the least.

With someone in the presidential chair who does not enjoy any personal power or any stable support, who is distrusted or regarded with animosity by the top rungs of the parties, by the leaders of the Armed Forces, by the Armed Forces, by the powers-that-be in the Church, by businessmen and trade unions, it is more than probable that an uncontrollable and savage war will be launched in the country, a war that would, more than likely, end with the rise to power of the strongest faction.

Against this, what could the electorate that brought Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo to power do?

Ironic View of Pintasilgo Interview

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 28 Oct 84 p 32

[Article by Jota B.: "Succession Dialogues"]

[Text] ...And one nice day, Maria Lourdes Pintasilgo really felt like she wanted to be the leader. What a temptation!

"Be careful. This is difficult, you know..." Eanes told her, while he was adding the final period to the 16th volume of his works dedicated to the "Introduction to Local Government," and thinking that reticence would be the best policy. "You don't know what a wasps' nest you are entering..."

"Ah, but I know, I know. I know and I am not averse to it. The Palace needs some work, but let's not exaggerate."

At that time of the morning, the general had still not turned on those batteries of a sense of humor attributed to him by the press, and could not understand if this was said in all seriousness, or, on the contrary, whether it was an indirect blow aimed at him. He chose, then, to get directly to the point. And he said:

"Hum...do you already have some support?"

"The people, all the people. Haven't you read the polls?"

"But the parties..."

"Here you go again with the parties. Democracy does not end up in the parties, the new political culture, the new forms of life, the new order..."

"Hey, hey!" interrupted Eanes with a half-smile, as if he wanted to protect himself against that torrential rain of "newness" pouring over him that, one could guess, was boiling up in Lourdes Pintasilgo's tirade. The president

already knew. Whenever she would start getting involved into the old tactics of the new policies, he would instinctively retreat for protection in his armchair and become very chagrined at not having succeeded in understanding that yarn about the new culture and its derivatives. Deep down, what upset him most was the fact that he did not know for sure whether the engineer included him in the old or the new culture. Defensively, he opted for evasion:

"Look, if that is the case, Dr Soares is also practicing new policies."

"Excuse me, but I don't think you understood what I said."

"All right," Eanes replied dryly, "then explain it to me."

"The great change of direction," the candidate started again, rather upset, "that is taking place in the mentalities and unleashing the emergence of new centers of demands whose influence is extending to future centuries--not to even mention the assiduity of the emotional currents that produce new alternative challenges on a planetary scale--condemn the old cultural forms (and I stress the dimensions of this rupture that will be brought about by the minorities) to irreversibility..."

"And how about the ex-CNARPE, dear engineer? Where do people place the ex'CNARPE?"

"Here we go again with the parties."

"It is not a party yet."

"But it will be. And while it will or it won't, while it is or it isn't, I shall go forward."

"So go, it is always something worthwhile. But don't say I didn't warn you."

A few hours later, the interview took place: "the new political culture...etc., etc., etc."

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CSO: 3542/35

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

REPORTED REASON FOR MUBARAK'S VISIT CANCELLATION

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 31

/Text/ TEMPO learned from a diplomatic source that the president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, has postponed "sine die" the official visit he was scheduled to make to Portugal next month due to an urgent trip to Baghdad. Rumors circulating in the Portuguese capital related the delay of Mubarak's trip to our country to the possibility of the opening of a Portuguese diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv.

As soon as the postponement "sine die" of the Egyptian president's trip to Portugal was learned, there were observers who interpreted it as a "cancellation" because of the good climate of understanding between Portugal and Israel.

There were also those who considered the postponement to be due to the mediation that Egypt is attempting between King Hussein of Jordan and the leader of the PLO, Yasir 'Arafat, with a view to a solution of the Palestinian question.

Hosni Mubarak is not coming to Portugal because he is going to travel to Baghdad where he will hold talks with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn with whom the Egyptian leader has maintained the best relations, notably since the beginning of the Gulf conflict.

The same source assured TEMPO that Mubarak's trip to Portugal was only postponed to a more opportune date, according to the terms of a report which a special envoy of the Egyptian president is due to present to President Ramalho Eanes within the next few days.

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CSO: 3542/40

PSD LEADERSHIP CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF CONSISTENCY

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 15 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Pedro Santana Lopes: "The Always Converted"]

[Text] It is not really difficult to be in politics if one assumes the following stand: always support what comes up, at the outset, with the reservation that, in case things go badly, the support will cease immediately.

That is the basic position that emerges from many interviews and statements produced by recent converts to the opposition to the present government (although, normally, not yet opposing the coalition because that depends, among other things, on knowing whether or not ministers more to the liking of the converts are going to be called--if not they themselves...)

After all, that is what many did at the time of the reelection of the current president of the republic: they said that they did not see any reason not to support him; that they did not understand why one should go looking for another general if there was one already; that they had not noticed any personal strategy, that it certainly did enter Eanes' mind to support a new party; and that thus, in that context, in those terms and that way, they would support the recandidacy, although guaranteeing that we could rest assured that, if things went badly, they would immediately withdraw their support...

In short, we know how it is, how it was and the flip-flops all of those people--always the same ones--are doing.

Well, it is that very thing that must be denounced. To be a politician is also to be able to foresee the future in terms of a prospective analysis based on the data of the present and past experiences. To be a politician is to be able to shout what one wants and what is rejected.

It is politicians who embark in all directions, providing they are not too aberrant, who go with the Democratic Alliance (AD), who are with the "central bloc," who support Eanes and Soares Carneiro, who are with the government and with a candidacy of their own--it is politicians of that type that have led this country to its present state.

What is difficult for politicians is to say "no" immediately after the emergence of a new situation and to explain the reasons for that refusal. And it is even more difficult to see those reasons confirmed by practice.

The Social Democratic Party (PSD)--but not only it--is full of politicians who go in all directions. For years, the same faces are always there, independent of the leaderships, the coalitions and the circumstances. What they seek is always to "remain afloat."

We believe that the PSD is still going to change, is still going to prove right those who warned against both the leadership of Pinto Balsemao and the consequences of the current government formula.

We also know that there are those who may have illusions of catching that "train" too, and of guaranteeing that they had never said what others heard with their own two ears.

It just cannot be that way! The PSD, as well as the country, needs a general housecleaning. And it's on the way!

8711
CSO: 3542/53

PORTUGUESE-SPANISH CONFERENCE ON NON-NUCLEAR IBERIA

Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 15 Nov 84 p 2

[Excerpts] The Portuguese-Spanish Conference for an Iberian Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons was held in Lisbon last weekend with the participation and presence of more than 100 Portuguese and Spanish independent personalities. The initiative had both national and international importance which the tightest television silence did not succeed in preventing. As for the future developments of this conference (see below), there is enough potential in them to impose and expand in the course of time what emerged this weekend at the Hotel Roma in Lisbon as an expressive reality: the determination of the two Iberian peoples to defend peace and detente and to fight to safeguard their mutual security, struggling for a total ban on the presence or transit of nuclear weapons in all of the territories of the two Iberian states. Prominent specialists and personalities from the social, political and cultural life of both countries participated in the conference; representing a broad spectrum of political opinions and beliefs, they gathered with the common objective of defense of peace and security. From members of political parties (the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), Spanish Communist Party (PCE), Socialist Party (PS), Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), Social Democratic Party (PSD), Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission (MDP/CDE), Leftist Union for Socialist Democracy (UEDS), "the Greens," etc) to independent personalities, including specialists and high-ranking military men, union leaders, deputies, local government officials, writers, poets, artists, the Portuguese-Spanish participation in this conference gathered a diversified ideological and political representation and prominent personalities.

Action Proposals

A group of action proposals emerged from the Portuguese-Spanish Conference for an Iberian Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons to be promoted immediately, and with a view to actions that will be carried out over the next year.

Thus, the conference proposed a joint manifesto, the publication of a bulletin, the publication of the report or book of the conference, the creation of the symbol or logo of the campaign (placard, poster, letterhead, displays, films).

It also proposed border or regional reunions or meetings (examples: Elvas-Badajoz, Vila Real de Santo Antonio-Ayamonte, Minho-Galicia, etc, etc) as well as support for the international conference of representatives of denuclearized municipalities convened for March 1985 in Cordoba.

Also planned are a Portuguese-Spanish Conference of Municipalities for an Iberian Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons in Portugal in 1985 and a Great Portuguese-Spanish Peace Festival at the border, where peace marches from various points of Portugal and Spain will converge in 1985.

And various meetings: of Portuguese and Spanish military men (in the reserve and specialists, on strategic questions and the reasons, implications and advantages, at the level of the security of the peninsula and the national defense of each of the two states--for an Iberian Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, in 1985;

Bilateral meetings of: deputies, jurists, writers and artists, doctors, scientific researchers, teachers, youth organizations, women's organizations, unionists, journalists, representatives of religious circles and organizations. As well as public sessions, seminars and joint discussions.

The establishment and development of international relations with identical movements in the Balkans, Scandinavian countries and other regions, and with the specialized organizations of the United Nations is also planned in the action proposals with a view to strengthening the movement on behalf of peace and detente.

In the meantime, by decision of the conference, the "Organizing Committee expanded with the reporters to the conference and other personalities invited by consensus, becomes the Continuation and Coordination Committee, with the responsibility of defining priorities and forms of putting these proposals into practice."

More than 100 Participants

The following individuals made up the list of Portuguese participants in the Portuguese-Spanish Conference for an Iberian Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons: Engineer Antonio Abreu, member of the Central Committee of the PCP; Paulo Areosa Feio, PCP deputy and leader of the Portuguese Communist Youth (JCP); Joaquim Miranda, PCP deputy; Dr Julio Almeida Carrapato, president of the Municipal Assembly of Faro; Dr Ferreira Alves; Manuel Arlindo Neves, president of the Municipal Chamber of Gondomar; Engineer Aquilino Ribeiro Machado, former president of the Lisbon Municipal Chamber (CML) and former PS deputy; Marshal Costa Gomes, former president of the republic and president of the Portuguese Council for Peace and Cooperation (CPPC); General Rangel de Lima; Lieutenant Colonel Melo Antunes, member of the State Council and former member of the Council of the Revolution; Colonel Cruz e Oliveira; Major

Sanches Osorio, writer Jose Cardoso Pires; maestro Antonio Victorino d'Almeida; Dr Medeiros Ferreira; writer Natalia Correia, member of the Social Communication Council and former deputy for the PSD; Dr Silas Cerqueira, member of the Portuguese Council for Peace and Cooperation; Engineer Sousa Marques, former deputy for the PCP; Dr Helena Rato; Antonio Gonzalez, deputy for the "the Greens" party; Manuel Lopes of the secretariat of the General Federation of Portuguese Workers/Intersyndical (GCTP-IN) and independent deputy for the PCP; singer Carlos do Carmo; teacher and writer Orlando de Carvalho; actor Mario Viegas; Jose Vieira, president of the Municipal Chamber of Almada and member of the Central Committee of the PCP; poet Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen, former deputy for the PS; Dr Alcina Bastos; Dr Beja Santos; Dr Melo Biscaia; Engineer Brito Apolonia, president of the Municipal Chamber of Moita; Professor Antonio Brotas; Dr Joao Camossa Saldanha; Dr Jorge Campos, president of the Municipal Assembly of Beja; a Engineer Luis Marques do Carmo; Jorge Correia, president of the Municipal Chamber of Seia; Corregedor da Fonseca, journalist and deputy for the MDP/CDE; Dr Artur Cunha Leal; Colonel Manuel Dantas; Colonel Carlos Fabiao; Dieter Dellinger, former deputy for the PS; Pastor Dimas de Almeida; Professor Fernandes da Fonseca; Admiral Filgeiras Soares; movie director Jose Fonseca e Costa; Dr Victor Garrido; Professor Emidio Guerreiro; Professor Manuel Gomes Guerriero, rector of the University of Faro; Joel Hasse Ferreira, deputy for the UEDS; Dr Mario Moura; economist Manuela Silva; Marcelo Curto, deputy for the PS; Margarida Marques, deputy for the PS; Dr Moradas Ferreira; Dr Maria da Gloria Padrao; Dr Parcicio Summavieille Soares, president of the Municipal Chamber of Fafe; composer Jorge Peixinho; Professor Mario Pinto; Colonel Pinto Ferreira; Fernando Raimundo Rodrigues, president of the Municipal Chamber of Ovar; Colonel Corte Real; Dr Beatriz Ruivo; Father Joaquim Sampaio; Admiral Simoes Teles; Soares Louro, former deputy for the PS and former president of Portuguese Radio and Television (RTP); Father Sousa Fernandes; Maria do Ceu Sousa Fernandes, deputy; architect Nuno Teotonio Peirira; Dr Suleiman Valy Mamede; Father Manuel Vilas Boas; Professor Vilela Mendes.

The list of Spanish delegates to the conference was as follows: Rafael Alberti, poet; Pedro Arrojo, pacifist; Jose Luis Barros, doctor; Jose Luis Buhigas, specialist in defense topics; Julio Busquets, deputy for the PSOE in Catalonia; Julio Caro Baroja, historian; Jose Miguel Bueno, deputy for the PSOE; Pablo Castellano, deputy for the PSOE and president of the First Justice Committee of congress; J. Carmona, councilman in the Municipal Chamber of Cordova; Miguel Cid, senator for the PSOE; Pedro Diez, president of the Chamber of Arganda for the PCE; Juan Genoves, painter; Jose Antonio Gimbernat, president of "Faith and Secularity"; Francisco Gonzalez, president of the Chamber of Parla for the PSOE; Gregorio Lopez Raimundo, deputy; Marcos Ana, poet; Fernando Marino, professor of international law in the University of Saragossa; Jaime Marti, engineer; Jose Maria Mohedano, president of the Pro-Human Rights Assembly; Jesus Alonso Montero, university professor and writer of Galicia; Jesus Montero, youth leader of the Communist Youth; Angel Orbe,

architect; Luis Otero, former commander; Javier de Paz, youth leader of the Socialist Youth; Pere Portabella, independent senator; Jose Quintana, president of the chamber of Fuenlabrada for the PSOE; Jose Ribera, director of the International Documentation and Information Center; Manuel Rojas Torres, president of the chamber of Badajoz for the PSOE; Francisca Sauquillo, senator for the PSOE; Antonio de Senillosa, writer and politician of the Democratic and Social Center (CDS); Ramon Tamames, economist; Francens Vicens, deputy for the Republican Left-Catalonia; Pedro Zarco, doctor and president of the Assembly of Doctors Against the Nuclear Danger; Carlos Iriarte, pacifist.

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CSO: 3542/53

GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF INTERFERENCE IN ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE

Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 8

[Excerpts] Serious accusations about the foreign policy conducted by the Portuguese Government have been raised recently by the news agencies of both Angola and Mozambique. Well-founded accusations which essentially emphasize interference in the internal problems of both countries (even assuming the form--as we know--of support for armed bands) and an evident neocolonialist spirit.

The immediate reason that led the Angolan News Agency (ANGOP) to comment on the inadmissible positions of the Portuguese Government were Mario Soares' statement to 10 businessmen who accompanied him to Mozambique, declaring at that time that the contacts underway between Mozambique and South Africa might influence "Angola in the direction of realism and not of a rush forward in the direction of ideology and sectarian orthodoxy."

We well known that, in the name of the now famous "pragmatism" in foreign policy, the Portuguese Government considers it a normal thing to sell the country at retail for the installation of bases or for its military use, and opens our borders wide to foreign capital--to mention only some facts. From that to the intent to impose the recipe on another is a step that is called interference, which properly gave rise to Angola's protest.

That is why ANGOP termed Soares' statements "gross interference."

Almost at the same time, NOTICIAS of Maputo published an article by the director of the Mozambican News Agency in which he directly pointed to the existence in Portugal of forces interested in the neocolonialization of Mozambique, which logically ties in with the "presence in Portugal and the activity with impunity of representatives of the armed bandits." Based on the logical interconnection of those facts, he advances another idea: "For the representatives of the bandits in Lisbon to be able to claim with complete impunity the kidnapping and murder of Portuguese in Mozambique" means that "there are policial, economic and financial forces in Portugal that are behind those representatives and protect them." That is: "That protection raises the most serious of deductions, namely, that the Portuguese Government exposes itself to the accusation that it is open to those forces and to the argument that those Portuguese kidnapped and murdered are the necessary sacrifices until those forces recover the domains of a neoempire for Portugal."

The most recent events underscore the timeliness of those charges. Not long after the broadcast of a propaganda program of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) terrorist band, Portuguese Radio and Television (RTP) interviewed the "secretary general" of another terrorist band, the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). Not only are facilities provided for the operation of terrorist groups in our country but they are given a forum even in that privileged means of mass communication that is the official television. The fact is evident: a policy of inadmissible interference in the internal life of other countries, which at the same time affects the interests of Portugal.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF FORMER CNARPE POLITICAL PROGRAM FORTHCOMING

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 28 Oct 84 p 5

[Text] In Espinho yesterday, supporters of the former CNARPE [National Committee to Support the Re-election of President Eanes] unanimously approved a document discussed in Abrantes in the middle of this year--the point of departure for the formulation of the program that will govern the political party force being formed.

However, the drafting committee elected to complete the program will have to observe some provisions discussed, voted upon and accepted yesterday by all those present, among which are notably "freedom of conscience and expression," a rejection of the "usual concept of so-called party discipline," and "greater internal democracy at all levels."

In addition to those principles, in the Abrantes document which will now be developed, there is the obligation and necessity to "reverse the direction of the economic policy followed until now and reject at the outset measures of a recessive type which do nothing more than contribute to intensifying the very causes of the crisis." As for the EEC, the supporters of the movement pledge to see that "the national interest is safeguarded in the negotiations for European integration, at the same time that they will advocate the diversification of trade relations."

In what may have been the most important speech of the day, Herminio Martinho, Eanes' national executive in Santarem, declared that only after the completion of the program will the "names, the team that will be presented to the country, insuring its implementation" be discussed. Herminio Martins said also that the movement is not the prisoner of the problem of a presidential candidacy and that at the "proper time" positions will be taken on the "candidate who gives every guarantee of support for implementation of the plans" being rebuilt.

There will be another national meeting by the end of the year to discuss the work of the program drafting committee.

Among those present--about 250--in addition to local government officials, socialists until now, such as the leader of the Socialist Party (PS) in the Municipal Assembly of Oporto, were the vice rector of the University of Minho, Professor Noronha Feio and Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos.

LISBON POLL REVEALS MINORITY OF PRACTICING CATHOLICS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 15

/Text/ "About 75 percent of the population of the patriarchate call themselves Catholic: 33 percent practicing Catholics and 42 nonpracticing Catholics; 3 percent other religions; 21 percent say they are indifferent, atheists or against any religion; and about 1 percent did not respond," according to a communique released by the Lisbon diocese to reveal the results of a socioreligious poll

This poll was conducted in the months of June and July and was directed at the present population of the patriarchate over 14 years of age through personal and direct interviews based on a previous inquiry with a sample of 1,000 persons, from which 988 useful questionnaires resulted, and contracting the four religions /as published, possibly meant "regions"/ into which the diocese is divided.

The poll revealed that "about 95 percent of the population has been baptized but only about 39 percent of those baptized have been confirmed; among married persons, about 71 percent were married in the church." It was learned also that "about 28 percent of those who consider themselves Catholics usually go to mass at least every Sunday and Holy Days, which corresponds to 21 percent of the total population considered, that is, over 14 years of age. It is observed that the concept of practicing Catholic (and of nonpracticing Catholic) which the interviewees attributed to themselves does not entirely coincide with the usual objective criterion of fulfilling the Sunday mass obligation. The most frequent reason that nonpracticing Catholics give for not practicing is invoked by about 36 percent of the interviewees falling into that category: they believe they can have their faith "without religious practice."

According to the communique of the patriarchate, "the poll also inquired about some aspects of the people's relationship with the places of worship." Ninety-one percent of the population studied, whether Catholics or not, know the location of the parish church in their residential area; about 85 percent of the Catholics who usually go to mass or practice other religious services, usually frequent the home parish church and 13 percent, the church in another parish; and for about 84 percent the main reason for going to the place of worship they usually frequent is proximity to where they live."

TV Religious Programs Are the Best Known

With regard to the questions in the area of the media (church publications, religious programs on the radio and television) the poll "made it possible to gather information of great interest. It was concluded that the most widespread means of communication is religious programs on television, which are regularly watched by about 16 percent of those questioned, with another 32 percent having answered that they see them sometimes."

The questionnaire also included three questions on the most important values in the life of the interviewees and in the lives of people in general, in their opinion, on the capacity to forgive and on the position assumed on a group of eight statements of a moral nature.

Of the list of values presented, 54 percent of those questioned considered the principal one having a happy family. The positions taken by the interviewees regarding the eight statements of a moral nature revealed that there was a certain variance between the criteria assumed by them--even among those who consider themselves practicing Catholics--and the standards of Christian morality proclaimed by the church.

Finally, opinions were gathered about the influence of the doctrine and activity of the church in various areas of social life, and attitudes were recorded regarding various realities of the Catholic Church itself, which contributed to the possibility of analyzing the dominant aspects of the image of the church among the population studied. The results indicate that between 28 and 30 percent of the total number of interviewees considered the influence of both the doctrine and activity of the church in Portugal in the areas of family life and education to be very positive. It was observed, however, that the highest figures (between 9 and 10 percent) of the replies which ascribe a negative influence to either the doctrine or the activity of the church in our country pertain to the area of unions and national political activity.

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CSO: 3542/40

BRIEFS

APU IN AZORES PARLIAMENT--For the first time in the history of the regional institution, the Azorean parliament now has a deputy from the APU /United People's Alliance/. He is Jose Decq Mota, elected for the Sao Miguel electoral district. The guarantee of a seat for Jose Decq Mota follows the decision of the National Elections Commission raising from 13 to 14 the number of deputies coming from that district. With this new deputy, the Assembly of the Azores will now have 44 deputies (28 from the PSD /Social Democratic Party/, 13 from the PS /Socialist Party/, 2 from the CDS /Socialist Democratic Center Party/ and 1 from the APU). The decision concludes a process of contesting the registration figures for the 14 October regional elections launched by the coalition led by the PCP /Portuguese Communist Party/ as soon as the election results were known. The National Elections Commission had already reported the general count decision to the assembly yesterday and forwarded the new map of distribution of deputies for publication in the DIARIO DA REPUBLICA. The Sao Miguel district has 84,630 registered voters, with a deputy for each 7,500 voters or fraction thereof over 1,000. /Text/ /Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Oct 84 p 3/ 8711

'STRONGMEN' IN SOARES GOVERNMENT--Some people were surprised when TEMPO revealed that the report that Dr Pinto Balsemao intended to become a candidate for the presidency of the republic had come from the prime minister's office. But there was nothing to be surprised about. Dr Mario Soares has a professional staff which naturally knows the activity of his political competitors. It is a fact that Dr Pinto Balsemao has had talks about his possible candidacy. One of those conversations was with Dr Lucas Pires, to learn if the CDS would present a candidate. After all, who is who in Dr Mario Soares' office? We can cite some names: Bernardino Gomes, office chief; Carneiro Jacinto, press secretary; and Alfredo Barroso, assistant secretary of state. Those are some of the "strongmen" in Dr Soares' office. /Text/ /Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 5/ 8711

AMARAL PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY--Social Democrat Fernando Amaral was elected president of the Assembly of the Republic yesterday with 174 votes for, 30 against, 22 abstentions and 1 blank. He will replace the Socialist Tito de Moraes in that position (the second in the state hierarchy), the latter having immediately presented a request for resignation from the position of deputy for reasons of a personal nature. Elected along with Fernando Armaraal (one of the presidents receiving the most votes in the history of the Assembly of the Republic) were the vice presidents, secretaries and vice secretaries of the

table of officers, almost all of whom are holdovers from the previous term. There were only two exceptions: the Social Democrat Lemos Damiao, who takes the places of his bloc colleague, Reinaldo Gomes, as secretary, and Luis Cacito (PS), who replaces Rosa Albernaz as vice secretary. /Excerpt/ /Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 26 Oct 84 p 3/ 8711

PCP DELEGATION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA--On 6 November, Comrade Vasil Bilak, member of the presidency and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), received in the Central Committee Comrade Sergio Vilarigues, member of the Political Commission and of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), on the occasion of his visit to the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia. The two representatives exchanged information about the current tasks of the two fraternal parties and confirmed the identity of opinions regarding the current development of the international situation and the international communist and workers movement. They expressed deep satisfaction with the level of cooperation existing between the CPC and the PCP as well as the readiness to strengthen and develop these contacts even more in the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism on behalf of the communist parties and peoples of the two countries. Comrade Radoslav Klein, deputy chief of the political section of the international of the CPC Central Committee also participated in this meeting. [Text] [Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 15 Nov 84 p 3] 8711

PCP DELEGATION TO GDR--A study delegation from our party on questions of long-term planning, comprised of Carlos Carvalhas, member of the Central Committee, F. Sequeira and Eduardo Silva, members of the Commission for Economic Activities attached to the Central Committee of the PCP, visited the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 23 to 29 October, having been received by Karl Janson, in charge of the Department of Socialist Economy of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). During its stay in the GDR, the delegation of our party held work meetings with the Central Plan Commission and in the Institute of Studies of Industrial Complexes. Traveling to the district of Erfurt, it was received by Kurt Rundnagel, district party secretary, visited an electronics enterprise and held meetings in the Municipal Chambers of Erfurt and Arnstad, as well as in the Municipal Council of the district. This visit, which was made in the framework of the relations of cooperation, friendship and solidarity that exist between the PCP and the SED, made it possible to learn SED policy in that aforementioned area as well as to have direct contact with the socialist situation of the GDR in other areas. [Text] [Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 15 Nov 84 p 3] 8711

PSD PARLIAMENTARY LEADERSHIP GROUP--The parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), at a meeting on 16 October, elected the leadership for the next legislative session, which is comprised as follows: President: Antonio d'Orey Capucho. Vice presidents: Fernando Cardoso Ferreira, Jose Gago Vitorino, Amelia Andrade de Azevedo, Jaime Simoes Ramos. Secretaries: Aderito Soares Campos, Jose Augusto Cesario. Voting members: Jose Silva Marques, Joao Malato Correia, Joao Rocha de Almeida, Daniel Bastos, Vasco Aguiar Miguel, Antonio Barbosa de Melo, Pedro Paulo Silva, Virgilio Paulo Goncalves Pereira. [Text] [Lisbon POVO LIVRE in Portuguese 24 Oct 84 p 1] 8711

COE REJECTION OF TURKISH PRESIDENCY SPARKS TUMULT

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 23 Nov 84 p 15

[Text] Ankara--In a statement in connection with the rejection of Turkey's bid to assume the chairmanship of the Council of Europe [COE] next year, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said: "This issue can be taken as far as our withdrawal from the COE. The COE is not such an important organization."

Ozal first responded to journalists' questions on the issue at the Grand National Assembly by saying: "We have not heard anything. Where did you learn it from?" One journalist asked: "It is reported that our foreign minister has withdrawn from the COE. Will this decision mean that Turkey is also withdrawing?" In response, Ozal said:

"If it becomes necessary, the issue can be taken as far as that. The COE is not such an important organization."

The Prime Minister added that he believes that his harsh statement on the issue has not reached the COE.

While departing from the Grand National Assembly at 11:00 pm, Prime Minister Ozal referred to the COE issue again and said: "Our minister will no longer attend the COE Ministerial Council meetings. We have an ambassador there. He will attend the meetings. When the Foreign Minister returns we will discuss these developments with him."

In a statement about the rejection of Turkey's bid to assume the chairmanship of the COE, the leader of the Nationalist Democracy Party, Turgut Sunalp said: "This is an undesirable event, but the result was expected. Our task is to campaign more actively with the help of our friends and allies without compromising anything from our commitments to the free world and the West."

Responding to the questions of the HURRIYET correspondent on the issue, Sunalp said that the government and the Foreign Ministry must pursue a more active policy and that all institutions of the republic must be brought into play in the pursuit of this policy.

Populist Party Secretary General Yilmaz Hasturk said with regard to the decision: "We want the government to formulate and to pursue a foreign policy that will uphold our honor."

Stating that certain "provocative centers" abroad are fomenting anti-Turkish activities, Hasturk said that an effective propaganda effort is not being waged against these forces and added: "The Prime Minister had said that there would be no compromises. Now the time has come to turn words into action. Let me make clear that this decision can never be the beginning of a path that will break us off from Europe. The Turkish nation is a member of Europe, and it is time to work effectively rather than getting angry and sulking."

Social Democracy Party Secretary General Hicri Fisek said in his statement on the issue: "The bid was made without adequate preparations."

Responding to the HURRIYET correspondent's questions in connection with the rejection of Turkey's bid to assume the chairmanship of the COE at the COE Ministerial Council meeting in Strasbourg yesterday, former foreign ministers Hasan Esat Isik and Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil said that they were not surprised by the decision and that "the timing [of the bid] was bad." The two former ministers also charged that this timing overshadowed the Limnos problem which is the primary issue for Turkey.

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CSO: 3554/54

COMMENT OPPOSES RUMORED ARIKAN SPLINTER PARTY

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 23 Nov 84 p 1

[Editorial: "BAP and BIP"]

[Text] It was obvious from the picture that emerged in the aftermath of the 6 November elections that, despite contentions to the contrary, the government that took office could not govern Turkey for five years, but no one could tell when and how the end would come. It was inevitable that power plays would cause dissolution within both the government party "which combined four political currents under its roof" and the opposition parties "without grass roots support."

Still, they survived too well. The Motherland Party is about to complete its first year in office, and while it is only now that people are talking about the birth of a new political organization called the Great Anatolia Party [BAP], the seeds of many events that could end this unnatural existence were sown in the course of this one year.

What are the chances of success for this new party which reportedly will be formed by former Minister of Finance Vural Arikан and his sister Turkan Arikан--a "defender of women's rights"--and which will be joined by assembly members from the other two parties? What will its political base be and who will it speak for? Precise answers must be found to these questions while the issue is still at the rumor stage.

It can be said that for the moment the party to be formed is not concerned about a "political base" and that its primary goal is to steal hitherto unknown concessions from the government party in accordance with the demands of Vural Arikан and the political viewpoint he represents. From this perspective, it would not be prophetic to say that the purpose of those who have assumed the speakership of the new party is not to become midwife for the birth of another "baseless" party, but to increase their bargaining power against the "motley" MP.

When saying "we shall protect the Turkish political life from the repetition of the bad examples of the past," it is probably not too rational to serve the not-so-honorable motives of certain individuals who have been pushed into prominence by coincidences.

We do not want to spend our lives listening to BAP's and BIP's.

DOCTRINAL FUNDAMENTALS OF NATO AIR DEFENSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Oct 84 pp 536-540

[Article by Lt Col Karl-Heinz Doescher (GS): "Doctrinal Fundamentals of NATO Air Defense in Central Europe. Threat to Central Europe by Air Forces of the Warsaw Pact"]

[Text] Change in the Threat

The comparison of the military forces of the East with those of the West, and the extent of the threat derived therefrom is the basis for the military assessment of the enemy's capabilities and the planning of friendly defense efforts. In assessing the specifically air defense-related threat, three main factors are decisive:

- the number of enemy air attack aircraft,
- the type and quality of these air attack resources, and
- the strategy and tactics used in the employment of these resources.

The air forces of the Warsaw Pact (WP), the potential adversary in a future war, have undergone fundamental qualitative and structural changes during the last decade. Especially the Soviet air forces have gotten away from their traditional role and the related functions of pure support of ground forces and homeland air defense. Through a rigorously implemented, extensive modernization, the Soviet air fleets are today capable of offensive air combat operations, i.e., of striking operationally and strategically important targets far to the rear of the combat area.⁽¹⁾ The primary objective is to accomplish the following at the outset of a conventional war:

- to prevent or at least delay the mobilization of NATO forces,
- to prevent the movement of overseas reinforcements to Central Europe, and
- to neutralize NATO control facilities, as well as
- to eliminate the counterstrike capability.

In this effort, maintaining the initiative at all times is the supreme policy of the East Bloc leadership. The Soviet Union and her allies will thus initiate major independent air offensives under unified central command immediately after a war begins, in order to force rapid decisions in the achievement of air superiority.⁽²⁾

This change in the Eastern aerial warfare doctrine must be viewed in conjunction with the change in Soviet strategic doctrine since the mid-1960's, in which an intensely fought conventional war of short duration is assumed to be the most probable type of future armed conflict in Central Europe. The Soviet Union thus wants to be prepared for all types of conventional operations, especially in aerial warfare, so as to be able to retain all options for her actions.

Quantitative Aspects of the Threat

Since 1959 the threat posed by air forces of the WP countries has increased not only qualitatively but also with respect to number of aircraft by circa 15 percent.⁽³⁾ The NATO area of Central Europe is today faced by circa 3990 aircraft,⁽³⁾ concentrated in the GDR, the CSSR and Poland, and in the three Western military districts of the USSR. In the most forward area where there are almost 2000 fighter aircraft and 1000 fighter-bombers, as well as more than 300 reconnaissance aircraft. All Soviet fighters are also suitable for use in the air attack role, while approximately a third of the fighter aircraft in the inventories of the WP countries are equipped exclusively for attack purposes.⁽⁴⁾

According to calculations of the NATO command, the NATO air defense forces would have to defend against up to ca. 10,000 enemy sorties (discounting possible losses of the WP) on the first day of combat.⁽⁵⁾ In addition there are the 550 combat helicopters thus far placed into service,⁽⁶⁾ which above all release the combat aircraft for other offensive missions.

The great number of airborne weapons systems of the WP constitute a significant threat just by virtue of the fact that they can cause a saturation of the weapons systems employed in NATO air defense.

Qualitative Aspects of the Threat

For the last several years, the WP has been methodically reequipping its forces with aircraft of the so-called "third generation." It is an accepted fact that more than 60 percent of the aircraft in the Soviet air armies already belong to the third generation.⁽⁷⁾ In the other WP countries, the reequipment is progressing without a break. The following developmental trends can be determined in the extensive modernization program:

--While retaining the total number of aircraft, the WP is continuously improving the avionics, armament and flight performance up to the latest state of technology.

--This has led to a threefold increase of the range. Today's combat aircraft are capable of reaching any point in Central Europe, some of them even without crossing the GDR-FRG (intra-German) border.

--The useful load/payload, consisting of airdropped weapons of the most modern type, was doubled.⁽⁸⁾

--The entire area of Central Europe can be attacked from all flight altitudes, with the very low altitudes (circa 30 m) being particularly difficult to cover because of the possibility of flying beneath friendly radar acquisition and the smaller radar reflection area.

--At the same time, all aircraft are capable of poor weather and night attacks (also at low levels) against stationary area targets, and in part--thanks to more accurate navigational and weapons employment systems--also against stationary pinpoint targets.⁽⁹⁾

--The quality of the threat is additionally influenced by the capability of operating in an electronic warfare environment, as well as the effective employment of self-generated electronic countermeasures (ECM).

In addition to this enormous continued development of its combat aircraft--the fixed-wing aircraft were addressed here--the WP is expanding its air attack capabilities with the formation of new combat helicopter regiments, which because of the flight characteristics specifically associated with rotary-wing aircraft pose special problems for NATO air defense.

Effects on the Defense Planning of NATO

This extensive modernization of combat aircraft, to be concluded in the near future and early when compared to the West, as well as the methodical formation of a strong combat helicopter component, enable the WP air forces:

--to launch an attack from their present position, without--in the past--having to regroup their forces and deploy them forward,

--to shift the point of main effort of WP air forces to the rear⁽¹⁰⁾ of the NATO territory, and:

--to pose a threat to the flanks of the Central Europe NATC territory.

This increased air defense-related threat becomes all the more critical when it is integrated into the overall picture of the WP counterpotential:

--the capability of ground forces for rapid, ground-gaining thrusts,
--the threat posed to our Atlantic sea links (overseas reinforcements), and
--the increasing offensive capability of the air war potential of the WP.

The threat is directed first and foremost against:

--our civilian population,
--NATO reinforcements and their ports of debarkation and airfields,
--the Allied air forces and their bases, and
--the nuclear weapons.⁽¹¹⁾

By virtue of the possibility of conducting effective surprise attacks against NATO's deterrent potential in Central Europe and of sealing off the combat zone, the capability of the WP air forces for achieving air superiority over

large areas of the combat zone has been increased. This has implications not only for the NATO air forces, including the integrated NATO air defense, but especially for NATO ground forces, their forward deployment, and freedom of maneuver as well.

Because of the aforementioned threat posed by WP air forces, which has grown rapidly in the last several years, the mission of the NATO air forces, particularly of the integrated NATO air defense, within the framework of NATO's overall defense, takes on special significance.

Mission and Responsibilities of Air Defense in Central Europe

Air Defense as Part of the Air War

Air defense (AD)⁽¹²⁾ encompasses all measures for defense against, and/or weakening of, attacks from the air, or, as defined by NATO: all measures aimed at negating or reducing the effectiveness of attacks by airborne air war resources. This objective can be achieved in two ways:

- actively, through engaging the enemy in the air; the means used for this are primarily fighter aircraft, air defense missiles and antiaircraft guns, and
- passively, through camouflage, deception, hardening, dispersal, and electronic countercountermeasures (ECCM).

Passive air defense measures are preventive responsibilities of all military services and civilian organizations.

Active air defense, as part of the air war, is the defensive component of the battle against enemy air forces and is thus closely interrelated with operations against enemy air forces on the ground, the offensive component.

The mission of the integrated NATO air defense within the overall active air defense framework results from its integration into the spectrum of air war responsibilities:

- in peacetime, to preserve the integrity of the airspace of NATO territory, and
- in a state of national defense, to defend European NATO territory against attacks from the air.

Derived from this are the essential responsibilities of air defense:

--In peacetime: surveillance of friendly and neighboring airspace; compliance with alert stages (depending on the air situation), so as to make possible an immediate and effective response, especially during times of tension' early/advance warning of friendly forces of an attack.

--In a state of national defense: protection of friendly territory and friendly forces; contribute to the attainment of air superiority by friendly forces through attrition of the air adversary.(13)

Integration of Air Defense in NATO

The security objectives of the alliance are spelled out in the so-called Harmel report: "The Future Responsibilities of the Alliance,"(14) In order to achieve the supreme political objective, a just and lasting peace in Europe with appropriate security guarantees, the alliance must, among other things, perform the following primary function: "...to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity, so as to have a deterrent effect on aggression and other forms of duress, and to defend the territory of the member states in the event aggression takes place."


This primary function gains a clearly defensive orientation by virtue of the tasks "deterrence" and "defense." NATO air forces, an instrument of a strategy of appropriate "flexible response," must be capable of operating from a defensive posture. For this purpose, a strong air defense, equal to the treat described above, is indispensable.

Since in Europe, and especially in the geopolitically vulnerable area of Central Europe, no nation by itself can prepare and carry out an effective defense against air attacks, air defense is conducted as a NATO-wide responsibility: air attacks against one nation are countered by air defense forces of the alliance.

Since it is the objective of NATO strategy to protect NATO territory in its entirety, and since it can be assumed that in Central Europe the main effort of an initial attack will be directed against the territory of the FRG, it is in the vital interest--especially of our Western NATO partners--that air defense measures during an act of aggression are taken as early as possible, i.e., already over the eastern part of the FRG ("forward defense").

Teamwork in air defense is an important characteristic of alliance solidarity and of the mutual will to resist. A prerequisite for the integrated NATO air defense is the timely detection of the threat and its immediate response capability. Because of the need for fast response, NATO countries since 1960 have already in peacetime made their weapons systems and control facilities (as "NATO Command Forces") operationally subordinate to the command authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR).⁽¹⁵⁾ On the one hand, this subordination enables the alliance to assure the integrity of its airspace already in peacetime and to react immediately to surprise air attacks, and, on the other, the principle of continuity of control is taken into consideration: without the delay that would otherwise be caused by a change of subordination, available air defense forces can immediately carry out their defense responsibility. They are controlled from integrated command posts in accordance with unified operational concepts in peacetime, in crises, and in a national defense emergency. At the same time, through operational consolidation of the area to be defended, the capability is developed for optimal employment of available forces in a combined system.

Figure 1: Command Structure (Air Defense)



Legend:

- CINCCENT = Commander-in-Chief Central Europe
- AFCENT = Allied Forces Central Europe
- AAFCE = Allied Air Forces Central Europe
- ATAF = Allied Tactical Air Force
- ADOC = Sir Defense Operations Center
- SOC = Sector Operations Center
- CRC = Control and Reporting Center

The NATO Air Defense Concept and the Contribution Made by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe)

Already in peacetime, the air defense of Central Europe is a fully integrated combined system extending from North Cape to Turkey. The heart of this defensive arc is the territory of the FRG, which because of its pivotal

location and its particularly critical geomilitary location (North-South frontage ca. 1000 km, East-West depth ca. 300 km) has a close-knit network of American, Belgian, British, German and Dutch air defense forces. The command structure (see Figure 1) is patterned on the principle of "centralized control and decentralized execution," the decisionmaking authority vested at as high a level as possible, so as to keep the option of crisis control open for NATO in case of a conflict. The provocation of a potential adversary is to be avoided and the unnecessary escalation of a conflict is to be precluded.⁽¹⁶⁾ The capability for a flexible employment of all air defense forces and resources reduces the calculability of the responses of the Western alliance, and this in turn means "deterrence without threat."

The responsibility ("Operational Command") for all air defense measures of the integrated NATO air defense in NATO-Europe (Allied Command Europe/ACE) in peacetime and in a national defense emergency is vested exclusively in the SACEUR with his NATO supreme headquarters SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Mons, Belgium.⁽¹⁷⁾

In view of the aforementioned capabilities of WP air forces, the air defense doctrine of NATO is oriented toward at least limiting the effectiveness of enemy air war resources in a national defense emergency to a sufficient extent to assure the adequate survivability of important Western installations and freedom of maneuver, especially of the ground forces. In this connection, the totality of vulnerable military and civilian facilities threatened by the hostile air war potential, whose survivability is of decisive importance for the overall defense, is characterized by a high number and density in the forward and rear combat zone.

Since NATO, as a defensive alliance, must initially leave the initiative to the enemy at the outset of an aggression, the air defense is doctrinally so planned that it can initiate defensive actions quickly, intensively, and as close to the border as possible.

The air defense forces will be employed in such a way that, operating under central control in a prescribed air defense area, they will be able to operate at maximum effectiveness while observing a balanced cost effectiveness ration.

Their incorporation in the integrated NATO air defense and the operational doctrine are based on optimum weapons effectiveness, geomilitary realities, and the extent of the threat.

In the process, the air defense forces are echeloned from East to West in such a way as to make possible a continuous, overlapping acquisition and engagement of hostile airborne targets, and thus an "area defense."⁽¹⁸⁾ Location, operational planning and procedures of the various systems have been so planned that, despite their location in different operating areas, they form a single network from the GDR-FRG border (or the "Forward Edge of Defense" in a national defense emergency) to a point deep in the rear area to the West, and in this way assure a unified air defense.

This combined system is complemented by antiaircraft forces which ground, air and naval forces maintain for the direct protection ("point defense")⁽¹⁹⁾ of their units and important facilities. The engagement of these weapons is a national responsibility and as directed by the local commander; however, they are nevertheless included in the functional network of the integrated NATO air defense.

The combined system of integrated NATO air defense consists of various elements. For early warning and air surveillance, as well as for the smooth cooperation of all forces and resources planned for air defense employment, the air defense doctrine provides for a ground control system based on a comprehensive network of fixed--generally hardened--command posts, early warning facilities, and control and reporting centers (CRC).

This system is supplemented by mobile components of the German Luftwaffe (low-flying aircraft reporting and control service (Tiefliegermelde- und Leitdienst/TMLD)) and the U.S. Air Force, as well as by the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS). This redundant system makes possible:

- the timely (radar) acquisition of hostile air attack forces, and
- the expedited processing, presentation and preparation of air situation data for the main command posts and air defense fire units.

With its radar control service, the German Luftwaffe operates 80 percent of the fixed command posts of the ground control system and makes personnel available for the operation of the integrated NATO command posts and the airborne NATO early warning system.

Warning service liaison offices have in part been integrated into the ground control system, which prepare air situation data for civil defense, based on which warning measures for the protection of the civilian population are decided upon.

The spectrum of weapons includes antiaircraft missile (SAM) systems with varying ranges and operational ceilings, fighter interceptors, and anti-aircraft guns, forming a network of weapons systems which complement one another with respect to their performance criteria.

The main emphasis in ground-based air defense is on

- the SAM System HAWK for engaging airborne targets (in the lower SAM zone) flying at low to medium altitudes, and
- the SAM system NIKE for engaging airborne targets (in the upper SAM zone) flying at medium to upper altitudes.

By maintaining a high readiness level, these SAM systems, even over an extended time period and at reasonable cost, can react quickly and can also be effectively employed against massed air attacks. They are deployed to cover an area, and especially in the forward area and in important areas to the rear assure a condensed area defense. The Luftwaffe provides circa 45 percent of the HAWK and NIKE weapons systems.

Fighter aircraft are employed as flexible weapons systems over large distances against points of main effort:

- to cover gaps in the SAM defense zones,
- for the protection of friendly operations, and
- to repel attacks from the flanks.

In peacetime and times of crisis, they are intended to be used in air patrol roles.

The German Luftwaffe has four tactical fighter units with aircraft of type F-4F Phantom. Of these, two have already been placed under NATO in peacetime, representing 25 percent of the total fighter interceptor inventory. The other two flying units can be assigned air defense responsibilities as required by the situation.

All-weather short-range SAM systems and AAA guns are planned for use in the protection of important installations, in keeping with NATO requirements.

The German Luftwaffe has at its disposal more than 1000 twin-barreled 20mm AAA guns and machineguns on twin mounts, which also in a national defense emergency are under national control as self and installation-defense weapons. In view of the constantly improved capabilities of WP air forces, this point defense system, including the passive defense measures, is no longer equal to the threat.

An adequate all-weather point defense system for at least the most important air bases will be available only from 1987 on with the introduction of the SAM system ROLAND.

Summary and Prospects for the Future

The offensive threat posed by air forces of the WP has increased quantitatively and qualitatively in recent years; it will also be intensified in the years ahead. The effectiveness capabilities of hostile air war resources have spread to all elements of NATO overall defense.

In view of this threat, an effective integrated NATO air defense within the framework of NATO air forces takes on increasing significance, especially in Central Europe. A substantial contribution to this is made by the German Luftwaffe, which has circa 31,000 troops assigned to air defense and provides over 30 percent of the air defense potential in the NATO area AFCENT.

The integrated air defense of Central Europe is reliable and operationally ready. This is borne out by the results of the "tactical evaluations" which at the direction of the SACEUR and in accordance with strict, uniformly applied testing and assessment guidelines of the SACEUR are conducted for several days each year by a multinational NATO inspection team in every air defense unit.

However, these positive findings, in view of the continually growing ~~problems~~ and ever diminishing funds in all NATO country budgets, should not obscure the fact that the integrated NATO air defense is beset by increasingly growing problems.

The current equipment of NATO air defense, when looking ahead to the future, is not satisfactory.(20) In essence, this currently applies to the obsolete NIKE weapons system and in the future to the F-4F and HAWK weapons systems. The all-weather protection of our airfields and other important installations continues to be problematical. The essential operational demands to be made of medium and long-range planning in the air defense area should therefore include:

--increase in firepower,
--improvement of jamming resistance,
--increase in survivability, also as the result of further improved mobility, and
--reduction of required operational costs in the form of savings in personnel and maintenance.(21)

FOOTNOTES

1. Karl Sasse et al: "The Role of Air Defense in the Framework of Overall Defense," in WEHRWISSENSCHAFTLICHE RUNDSCHAU, 30th Year, 1981, p 11.
2. Friedrich Obleser: "The Role of Air Defense Forces in Central Europe and the Contribution of the Luftwaffe," in JAHRBUCH DER LUFTWAFFE, 1981, No 14, p 9.
3. Reply given by State Secretary Dr Ruehl on 22 Aug 1982 to a question by Member of Parliament Dr Todenhoefer regarding the WP/NATO strength balance in Central Europe, in DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, 10th WP, Drs. 10/320, 26 Aug 1983.
4. Mark Lambers: "U.S. Air Defense in the Federal Republic of Germany," in INTERAVIA, 35th Year, 10/1980, Oct 1980, p 915.
5. Ibid.
6. State Secretary Dr Ruehl, op. cit.
7. Sasse et al, op. cit.
8. Ibid.
9. Brian Winstall: "Surface-to-Air Missiles of the West," in INTERAVIA, 6/1983, p 597.

10. According to statements made by Lt Gen Eimler, Luftwaffe IG, before the Defense Committee (7th meeting on 28 Sep 1983), the strength of WP air forces for in-depth attacks has been tripled.
11. Oblessier, op. cit.
12. The concept "air defense" includes
 - "Air/Aircraft Defense of All Troops": Responsibility of all military services, utilizing appropriate weapons and in part independent service branches under national control, albeit in close coordination with NATO air defense. Tactical mission: point defense/self-protection.
 - "Integrated NATO Air Defense": Autonomous mission at NATO level, carried out by specialized forces subordinate to NATO and under joint NATO operational control. Strategic mission: preservation of the integrity of NATO airspace.Source: Peter Beutin et al: "The Military-Strategic and Security-Political Significance of Air Defense," in TRUPPENPRAXIS, 26th Year, No. 2/1982, p 79.
13. "The German Contribution to the Air Defense of Central Europe," in WLHR UND WIRTSCHAFT, 11-1967, p 580.
14. Appendix to communique of the Ministers Conference of the North Atlantic Council on 14 Dec 1967, in EUROPA ARCHIV, 23rd Year, No 3/1968, p D75 ff.
15. SACEUR = Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
16. Joerge Kuebart: "The Air Defense of Central Europe with the Participation of the German Luftwaffe," in JAHRBUCH DER LUFTWAFFE, 1981, No. 14, p 26.
17. "NATO Air Power," in AIR PICTORIAL, 41 (1979) 9 Sep 1979, pp 339-340.
18. "Area Defense" is the overriding strategic protective function of NATO air defense. It is characterized by
 - area-covering firepower,
 - deeply echeloned deployment, and
 - complementing effectiveness of all weapons systems in the functional network.
19. "Point Defense" is the condensed configuration of antiaircraft weapons and their concentrated firepower for the supplementary protection of important military installations and civilian resources. Characteristic in Central Europe are regional points of main effort as well as local concentrations of air defense weapons for the protection, for example, of ground forces operating areas, of harbors, airfields or main command posts.

Source: Beutin, op. cit., p 81.

20. Eberhard Eimler: "Air Defense in the NATO area," in EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE, 32nd Year, No. 9, September 1983.
21. Ibid.

LUFTWAFFE'S AIR DEFENSE COMBAT CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIBED

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Oct 84 pp 544-548

[Article by Lt Col Peter Hesse: "The Combat Control System of Air Defense"]

[Text] For approximately a decade, a computerized combat control system known as NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) has been in use. Participating in this system, aside from the FRG, are Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. A predecessor system (GROWTH TO FULL NADGE/GFN) is still being utilized in one Belgian, one Dutch and two German air defense sites.

France and the U.K. have their own systems, which automatically exchange data with NADGE, however.

Since 1980 the GEADGE (German Air Defense Ground Environment) system is being phased in in the southern part of the FRG. GEADGE can be considered to belong to the third generation of military control and data systems. Significant tactical improvements are:

- Radar interlacing, integration of air traffic control (ATC) radars, target track determination utilizing several radars, and introduction of remote radars,
- Introduction of a status indicator system with remote input stations on the airfields,
- Multifaceted training facilities for operational training,
- A new communications link network with direct dial facility and computer-controlled alternate routing switches.

Air war operations in Central Europe take place against a complex and dynamic background. This is caused on the one hand by the multiplicity of participating forces in the air and on the ground, as well as the multiplicity of different but in part simultaneously occurring friendly and hostile actions, and secondly, by the geographic narrowness of the area in the command sector.

Against this background, air defense is conceivable only as a cohesive whole having high-performance control for the realization of the full potential of friendly weapons systems. It was for that reason that, already in the 1960's, NATO created the basis for this through an integrated air defense control system, which since then has been operational from Norway to Italy.

Control in a system such as this is a highly dynamic process which assures the rapid coordination and mutual operational complementation of the various defensive weapons systems as well as with air war operations of offensive and support air weapons and their control systems.¹⁾

Combat control begins below the higher or strategic control. The purpose of strategic control is to assure the effectiveness and efficiency of all activities serving the attainment of the goal. Combat control, on the other hand, is characterized by decision-making processes aimed at determining the ways and means for carrying out individual tasks prescribed by strategic control in accordance with the rules governing mission-type orders. Combat control is therefore closely linked to the accomplishment of the strategic mission.

Control in the general sense is concerned with the performance factors: man, materiel, and data. Combat control in air defense is the control of tactical measures essential for carrying out the assigned tasking. The performance factor man is to a large extent neglected in the control process. The procurement and positioning of materiel is likewise largely outside the area of responsibility of combat control. Combat control in air defense is thus concerned primarily and almost exclusively with the performance factor data: the control problem in combat control is the mastery of this performance factor.

The high speeds of hostile air war resources require immediate action especially in air defense. For that reason, the time factor has a great influence on the control processes. The control of the performance factor data in air defense is decisively hampered by the additional dimension of (lack of) time.

The sections that follow will deal with the system that was created in NATO air defense in order to control the performance factor data for mission accomplishment up to the point of deliberate weapon employment against the threat within the prescribed time period. This is tantamount to the contribution made by the radar control service of the Luftwaffe to the combat control system of NATO

air defense primarily at the SOC and CRC²⁾ levels. This is the level of tactical combat control on the lower control level and its execution by the CRC.

Mission

The NATO air defense combat control system³⁾ supports the control through data acquisition, data processing, and data exchange for the purpose of situation assessment, and in this way generates essential basic data for strategic control and the employment of air forces as a whole. The employment of the defensive weapons systems is controlled, and their interaction with other users of the airspace coordinated, from the command posts of the control system.

Operations

Derived from this are the operational tasks which in air defense are carried out and/or supported by the combat control system at the CRC directly. These tasks are performed around the clock:

- Preparation and dissemination of a current air situation picture through utilization of available sensors and data, plus maintenance of the air situation determination process through sensor management, including control of electronic emissions (emission control).
- Operational control and coordination of all forces utilized for air defense operations (including airborne early warning systems).
- Support of air attack and support operations while in progress.
- Coordination of employment of short-range air defense weapons.

The aforementioned increasingly complex environment of air defense operations has led to shifts of emphasis in the operation of the CRC. For that reason, developments will be highlighted and more closely considered below which must be added to the traditional responsibilities of the CRC.

"Battle Management" is taken to mean the continuing operational control of the allocated forces, the support of operations of all air war resources operating in or entering the areas of responsibility of the CRC, the coordination of employment of the various weapons systems among one another and with other operations, as well as the active application of airspace regulation measures while carrying out these responsibilities. (Depending on the equipment assigned, battle management can take place at all control levels at which there is active and direct intervention in the battle.)

Combined Air War Operations are temporally and spatially cohesive, limited actions of air forces, in which, in order to achieve a certain objective, resources of varying types and operational roles operate together under common control⁴⁾.

Because of its extensive communications equipment, the CRC is able to make a significant contribution in the preparation and execution of combined air war operations, and it has the capability of reacting appropriately and promptly to dynamic situation changes.

Tactical Radar Support takes place in accordance with the "flight following"⁵⁾ and "tactical direction"⁶⁾ processes. It encompasses, for all airborne forces, navigational support, protection against unintentional engagement by friendly weapons systems, as well as giving warning in the event of airspace regulation measures violations and approaches by hostile aircraft.

Operation of Military Air Traffic Control

Military air traffic control has the capability of supporting part of the tasks encountered in the control system, thereby giving partial relief to the individual CRC and enabling it to perform other tasks.

Organization

The structure of the combat control system is governed by a control organization which in essence is based on a comprehensive network of fixed, generally

hardened Control and Reporting Centers (CRC) which are subject to tactical control by sector command posts [Sector Operations Centers (SOC)].

These SOC's are consolidated in the integrated NATO air defense system ADGE.⁷⁾ The latter is supplemented by the U.S.-national mobile combat control system "Tactical Air Control System" (TACS), by the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW), as well as the low-flying aircraft reporting and control service [Tieffliegermelde- und Leitdienst (TMLD)], which operates from permanently manned sites close to the border to supplement the target acquisition of fixed long-range radars, or from a mobile configuration.

Within the framework of the NATO air defense control system, the Luftwaffe operates:

- Control and Reporting Centers (CRC),
- Remote Radar Posts (RRP),
- Radar Teams, and
- Low-Flying Aircraft Reporting and Control Centers,

and makes a substantial personnel commitment to the:

- Sector Operations Centers (SOC) and the
- NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) E-3A Unit.⁸⁾

Elements of the Combat Control System

For the most part, the planning and command process in the combat control system is carried out in the SOC, while the necessary spatially and temporally limited, situation-oriented support of its execution is assigned to the CRC's. The basis for this is a data system of the CRC's, which play the key role as a collecting and dissemination station for situation data and time-critical tactical data. Available to the CRC's for this purpose are extensive data processing facilities and communications links, as well as a diverse number of sensors.

Sensors

The primary means for the acquisition of data in the combat control system are radars. Over large distances, they reliably provide three-dimensional positions of flying targets for the situation map as well as additional data on flying target identification.

The radar control service operates large-area-covering radars in the CRC's and the RRP's.⁹⁾ The data acquired is used in analog or digital form for preparing the air situation and in the employment of weapons.

Gaps in the acquisition are filled by the operation of appropriately sited mobile radars, utilizing either fully mobile radars of the TMLD or so-called "gap filler" radars. The latter are equipped in part with a radar extractor

which permits remote operation as a mobile (transportable) remote radar post (RRP), with radar data being transmitted in digital form to the CRC's and processed there.

Individually employed ground-based radars have two major weaknesses. For one thing, they have shadow zones caused by the curvature of the earth and the topography; because of this, their acquisition capability at very low altitudes is limited and in rugged terrain it is even interrupted. Secondly, their data renewal rates are too low. These shortcomings are countered by the following two projects.

NAEW and AEGIS

Project NATO Airborne Early Warning¹⁰⁾ (NAEW) surely represents the most obvious, but also the most far-reaching, improvement in the control system. In principle, NAEW stands out by virtue of its radar coverage from an elevated position and the resultant acquisition of targets deep inside enemy territory and at very low altitudes. This includes the capability of tactical early warning and the immediate response to the development of a dynamic threat. NAEW offers dimensions to strategic control which thus far have not been possible with stationary radars: large-area marine reconnaissance and fast, flexible concentration of effort in case of equipment outages on the ground.

As part of the complementary project AEGIS (Airborne Early Warning Ground Integration System), combat control facilities of the ADGE are being improved in such a way as to permit them to accept data from the NAEW aircraft.

Radar Interlacing and Improved Target Track Determination

Through the GEADGE project the combat control system experiences a further significant improvement in its air surveillance capability: radar interlacing and target track determination utilizing several radars-multiple radar tracking (MRT). When employing radars individually, overcoming the acquisition limitations, e.g., those caused by ground returns, is a major effort and from a tactical viewpoint unreliable. Through radar interlacing and MRT, the system is given the capability of generating cohesive, tactically usable target tracks even under unfavorable conditions, e.g., with radar shadowing. This is made possible by utilizing the data of several sensors in combination for the determination of a target track. In that way the sporadically missing acquisition by a single radar is overcome, i.e., an improved data renewal rate is achieved.

In addition thereto, radar interlacing makes it possible to deliberately turn off individual radars for tactical reasons while retaining a tactically suitable coverage of the airspace.

HADR

The Luftwaffe is currently introducing a new HADR (Hughes Air Defense Radar)¹¹⁾ radar. This is a flexible, ECM-proof air surveillance radar having a large share of software and firmware, which assure adaptability to various tasks as well as possible future improvements. A freely programmable scanning concept

makes possible a multiplicity of operating modes, so that in prescribable sectors the radar can also perform varying tasks. Special attention during the development of the planar antenna was given to achieving maximum side lobe blanking, thus creating an essential prerequisite for ECM resistance.

The new radar signal processor of the radar represents new ground for the Luftwaffe: here the target extraction is carried out after digitalization of the radar data previously shown in analog form, thus simplifying the subsequent processing of plot data in digital form in the data processing of the CRC.

Communications Links

The communications equipment of the combat control system is a substantial element of the data and control system. It depends on the availability and the capability of this equipment whether what is achieved in other branches of the control system can in fact be converted to control, i.e. whether one's will can be asserted. This means that the extent of control capability is decisively determined by the performance capability of its communications systems and the latter's survivability. A lack of reconnaissance can be bridged by intuition and a lack of automated data processing by manual emergency procedures, but without communications links the controller is powerless and his control prerogative cannot be realized.

For that reason, the individual elements of the air defense control system are embedded in a close-meshed data combine consisting of many varying types of links.

The communications facilities of the control system encompass:

-Telephone links for the transmission of data which is needed in written form.

-Voice radio links in the UHF, VHF and HF bands for voice communication with airborne forces, with the area coverage being capable of enlargement in individual cases through the remote control of remote facilities.

-Data transmission (DT) links, for the computer-controlled exchange of data and commands between individual elements on the ground, and between ground stations and dialogue partners in the air and at sea. The DT between computers of differing operating modes is particularly problematical, but at the same time critical for the establishment of the data interlocking network. For that reason, standardized data formats are used throughout NATO.

In view of the improved possibilities in the area of data technology and data intercepts, the capability of defense against hostile intercepts is taking on ever increasing significance in the communications area. While until now it had been felt that, because of the short life of the data exchanged in the air defense control system, one could be relatively lenient, this is no longer true today.

The employment of efficient data processing facilities in surveillance, coupled with improved sensors, calls for an extension of protective measures in this

area as well. The NATO E-3A, for example, already exchanges situation data with ground-based elements of the control system via a jamming-resistant and intercept-proof link.

Data Processing

The main areas in which data processing is applied in the control system are primarily those in which very many, little structured input data must be processed in the time allotted so as to make possible an appropriate quick reaction by control. In the process, direct support is given by data processing in the:

- situation determination,
- issuance of commands, and
- control,

and indirectly in the planning. The original (non-derivative) prerogative of the controller to assess the situation and make decisions, i.e., the control responsibility, remains in human hands. The reason for the employment of data processing in the control system is not the automation of control, but to improve the data of the controller.

Example: Air Situation Preparation

The echo signals supplied by the radars are digitalized and are then used by a computer for updating existing flight tracks, or, if they cannot be correlated with an existing track, for the determination of new flight tracks. The flight tracks are shown on the display units as moving symbols; the wealth of additional data of the associated data record can likewise be displayed. The data from the IFF equipment is used for identification purposes, and the flight plans¹²⁾ automatically relayed to the CRC computer by air traffic control are compared, and if appropriate correlated, with current air situation data on a continuing basis.

If the locally determined air situation is of significance for the neighboring CRC or other elements of the control system, it is automatically transmitted. In addition, an extract of the air situation is reported to the superordinate SOC-a mission-oriented data compression. Several partners (e.g., also the NAEW) can participate in a simultaneous exchange of data with a CRC.

In this process, data from various sources is continually processed, displayed and offered to other users without perceptible delay.

Example: Weapons Employment (Single Target Engagement)

For a target that is to be engaged, it is first of all determined, when so requested, which of the available weapons systems--SAM or fighters--can most quickly engage the target successfully. When allocated to the weapons system, the estimated target engagement positions are computed and displayed on a continuing basis, as are--in the case of fighters--the flight maneuvers that must

be flown up the completion of the intercept. Just as data processing supports the ground control intercept (GCI) officer, human intervention in the operating sequence--programmed with rigid parameters--is often required. This presupposes a high level of skill and knowledge.

Example: Status

The available weapons systems are in varying states of configuration, readiness or combat status. The reliable up-to-date awareness of this data is imperative for the controlling officer and the basis of his decisions in the management of his resources.

¹³⁾ In the GSDS all status data of the control system and the weapons systems of importance for control purposes are displayed in real time by an independent, secure network between the CRC's. In case of computer-assisted changes of status, the appropriate change in the display is made automatically, otherwise by means of a manual input. Wing command posts are linked to this process via input stations, and the data bank of the GSDS is directly and continually replenished with data on the mission program. And finally, closed TV circuits make possible flexible, format-free transmission of maps, weather data, etc.

Example: Training

It was already realized very early that the training of radar operations and control personnel, utilizing airborne systems, was cost-intensive and beset with limitations. For this reason, much attention was given to this aspect in the layout of the data processing used in the combat control system.

The data processing facilities used in the control system are suitable for the simulation of individual operational cycles and in particular are able to depict entire air situations involving more than one site over an extended period. This makes it possible to conduct targeted individual training at all levels as well as large-scale operational training involving many air defense components.

The Human Factor in the System

Relevant discussions of the control capability frequently give preference to system-technical aspects and the performance factor "time." The human being ¹⁴⁾ as the operator likewise constitutes a determining quantity in the system. A human being, for example, can be very quickly confused by a large, disordered flood of data. This phenomenon must be taken into account in the layout of the system. The requirement resulting from this is as follows: data processing appropriate for the level and mission and analogous to the mission-type order. Modern technology is capable of satisfying this requirement. However, technical progress also contains a risk in its application. The multiplicity of the resources employed for data acquisition creates a situation in which the human being is overtaxed by the management of the interaction of these resources. The human being reacts to such overtaxing through a reduction in the utilization of the possibilities offered by the data. This in turn means that the full potential of individual elements is not exploited and ultimately leads to an unacceptable curtailment of the original responsibility of the controller. For that reason, not everything that is feasible should be uncritically put

into effect: the human being must remain in control of the system; the system is supposed to expand, not restrict. Only in this way will the system's potential, control capability, actually be realized.

Another aspect in the contemplation of the human being in the combat control system should not go unmentioned. Already in peacetime the combat control system is subject to a high attrition rate in the personnel area. The high readiness demands, shift and holiday duty around the clock lead to considerable stress and strain. The Maginot syndrome is well known, as are the consequences. The troops in air defense are rightfully called soldiers of the first hour. In the future, it is therefore absolutely essential to include in the system layout, with the weight that it deserves, the factor of preservation of performance readiness and capability.

Prospects

Every system in its entirety is only as good as its weakest points. When NATO introduced automation into the combat control system in the late 1960's, this was a significant step into the future. The importance of this step has in the meantime naturally been modified by developments in technology and in the threat. For that reason, adherence to what has been achieved in the air defense combat control system is unacceptable.

Because of this and the doubtlessly still existing weaknesses in the control system, the NATO countries have agreed on a joint viewpoint and are striving to make improvements in the following areas:

- creation of an interlocking air defense-air attack control system.
- continued improvement and interlacing of the sensor base,
- meshing and automating the communications system, and
- achievement of the functional and data network for all military services in the airspace management sector.

These improvements will presumably be realized in a joint, overlapping project ACCS (Air Command and Control System).¹⁵⁾ Beyond that, improvements must concentrate particularly on the areas of:

- a jam-proof and deception-proof TFF system, and
- the development of a surveillance network linking air reconnaissance and communications electronic surveillance with the processing and transmission system of the combat control system.

In this way, one could insure that, in the future as well, the combat control system will be equal to the requirements levied on it.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. Lt Col Luebbe (GS), "The Control of the Luftwaffe in War and Peace," TRUPPENPRAXIS 7/79.
2. SOC = Sector Operations Center = Sector Command Post, CRC = Control and Reporting Center (Flugmelde- und Leitzentrale)
3. Cf. box on p 544; hereafter, unless otherwise noted, the combat control system of NATO air defense will be equated to the ADGE (Air Defense Ground Environment).
4. Cf. Col Kleppien (GS), "Combined Air War Operations," TRUPPENPRAXIS 11/83, pp 826 ff.
5. The task of maintaining voice radio contact with an aircraft for the purpose of flight development and/or completion (cf. ATP-6, 2-68).
6. Defined as flight path tracking during tactical missions, with the fixing of the flight path being taken over by the combat control system when it becomes necessary against the hostile background (threat by SAM or fighters).
7. Cf. box on p 544 and footnote 3.
8. Cf. footnote 10, p 8.
9. Remote Radar Post.
10. Airborne radar systems have become known by the name AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). The designation NAEW currently includes the U.S. E-3A AWACS and the British NIMROD.
11. Cf. Hassler and Schneider, "GEADGE and HADR Air Defense is Modernized," WEHRTECHNIK 1/84, pp 27 ff.
12. Procedure introduced with GEADGE.
13. GSDS = General Status Display System; introduced with GEADGE.
14. As opposed to the human being as a controller or controllee.
15. E. Skibbe, "Command and Control Systems in NATO," WEHRTECHNIK 6/84, pp 82 ff.




Figure 8: Schematic of a modern data processing facility of the control system. The data processing component consists of a central computer and five auxiliary computers. Direct operations functions are carried out in the central computer, such as air situation preparation through target track determination, identification, flight plan correlation, and weapons employment. The peripheral equipment, such as magnetic tapes, printer, disc, and input-output working position, are controlled by means of an auxiliary computer, as are the display units at the working position. Data exchange with other control facilities as well as with the connected radars, the remote reporting posts, and the SAM units, takes place via two other computers, and the status display system and on-line simulation via the fifth auxiliary computer.

12689
CSO: 3620/121

ROLE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN NATO AIR DEFENSE DOCTRINE

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Oct 84 pp 540-543

[Article by Lt Col Johannes Muermans: "The Luftwaffe in NATO Air Defense. Fighter Aircraft"]

[Text] The air defense forces of the Luftwaffe are already operationally subordinate to NATO in peacetime. Through a high degree of operational readiness and their constant presence, they make a contribution during peacetime to conventional deterrence. If they should have to defend themselves, they begin their defensive operations with operational intensity as close to the border and as early as possible, with the aim of:

- preserving the integrity of the territory of the FRG,
- allowing the mobilization and forward movement of FRG and other NATO forces,
- protecting important installations, and
- assuring the successful movement of reservists and reinforcements from overseas.

These responsibilities require a complex, deeply echeloned air defense system that must be capable of early identification of the enemy's intentions, engaging the attacker as far forward as possible, and subjecting the enemy to a constantly intensifying firefight far to his rear.

From a logistic and economic, but also operational, standpoint, it would be desirable to conduct air defense in the purest sense, i.e. either with fighter aircraft or SAM systems alone. However, all research in this connection has repeatedly shown that air defense with a mix of fighters and surface-to-air missiles has a greater defense effectiveness and more survivability. In a weapons mix, the strengths of the SAM systems, namely:

- high firepower,
- short response time, and
- high state of readiness even over extended periods,

complement the capabilities of fighter aircraft, that is:

- quick formation and shifting of points of concentration,
- engagement of air targets outside the range of ground-based weapons systems, and
- engagement of targets below the operational horizon of ground-based radars.

In addition, a weapons mix precludes the enemy's concentrating and optimizing his combat tactics and electronic countermeasures (ECM) on a single weapons system.

Mission and Organization of Fighter Units

The airborne weapons systems of air defense have the following missions:

In peacetime and crises:

Securing the airspace within the framework of air sovereignty tasks (air policing), i.e. identification of unknown aircraft, forcing them to change course or land, if need be by force provided an unmistakably hostile act precisely spelled out in regulations has gone before. To be sure, the air sovereignty responsibilities of the Luftwaffe are subject to limitations because of agreements with the allies.

In wartime:

Formation of defense points to main effort

Engagement of concentrated and channelized mass incoming flights in unison with SAM systems

Closing breaches and gaps in teamwork with SAM systems


Protection of friendly territory at the northern and southern flanks

Engagement of targets that are beyond the effective range of friendly SAM system


Engagement of standoff jammers and standoff weapons carriers

Support of friendly air attack forces over enemy territory through air escorts and fighter sweeps.

In view of the offensive potential of the Warsaw Pact, effective air defense at the national level is no longer possible, for which reason the countries have subordinated their air defense forces to NATO already in peacetime, in order to be able, in the event defensive action is required, to counter the attacker jointly, with little delay, and with an organization that can work together. For the German air defense flying units, this means the following subordination:



The wings are organized in keeping with their primary mission, i.e. conduct of combat sorties, combat support, air traffic control, and support, as follows:



The peacetime strength of the wing is circa 1800 soldiers and civilian employees. This manning will be substantially augmented in a national defense emergency by reservists, most of whom will be assigned to air traffic control.

The F-4F Weapons System

This system was introduced to Luftwaffe wings from 1974 on, at which time the F-4 was the highest performance fighter aircraft available.

The F-4 weapons system has been operational since the early 1960's in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy and with the air forces of many other countries, and in the process has compiled an extraordinarily good record. The F-4 was further developed and improved in more than 10 versions as a fighter, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft. Its total production of more than 5000 aircraft make the F-4 the most produced tactical combat aircraft of the western world since World War II.

The F-4F is a two-seater fighter and fighter-bomber and is equipped with two power plants of J79.

The crew consists of the pilot and the weapons system officer (WSO). The pilot is responsible for the execution of the operational mission, he steers the aircraft during the entire mission, determines the tactics, operating procedures, and in the engagement phase fires the weapons. The WSO supports the pilot in all phases of the mission; he operates the important onboard systems radar, navigational equipment, and defensive avionics; he monitors the airspace visually in coordination with the pilot; and in the attack phase, during which the pilot must concentrate on the target in front of him, he checks the area behind the aircraft so as to preclude surprise attacks from that quadrant.

Dimensions, Weights and Performance of the F-4F

Wingspan	11.71 m
Length	19.20 m
Height	5.00 m
Weight (empty)	14,742 kg
Internal fuel	3,216 kg (with the addition of three external tanks, range and flight time can be substantially increased)
Thrust	2 X 8,120 kp with afterburner 2 X 5,390 kp without afterburner
Speed	Mach 1.1 + near ground level Mach 2.0 + at 12,000 m altitude
Turning rate	15 degrees per second
Load factor	+ 8.5 G, - 3 G

Combat Avionics and Attack

The onboard radar is able to acquire and track targets at distances of over 60 km and flying at medium and high altitudes. At low levels the range of the radar drops considerably. Target searches near ground level are primarily conducted visually by the pilot.

The radar warning receiver tells the crew whether their aircraft is in the search or tracking zone of an enemy radar. In this process, a distinction is made between ground-based equipment and airborne radars, so as to enable the crew to begin taking preparations for the best-suited countermeasures.

With the radar jamming and decoy transmitter, target search and target acquisition by enemy radar can be delayed or a false target simulated. When using infrared countermeasures (IR) decoy flares, this transmitter helps to improve the survivability of our fighter aircraft.

In aerial combat, air targets can be engaged down to very short ranges with the 6-barreled 20mm gun M61; the hit probability is greatest when the enemy is attacked from the rear.

A gun attack normally takes place with radar lock on of the target, in which case the lead angle and the calculation of the distance to the target are automatically fed into the optical sight.

Aside from the gun, the F-4F in its fighter role is equipped with four IR-guided missiles of type Sidewinder AIM-9L. The AIM-9L is currently the highest performance short range guided missile; it can be fired from all air combat situations, and for the first time with a weapon of this type also in a head-on attack. During engagement with the missiles, just as in an attack with the gun, the radar target data is utilized by the weapon's computer for range determination and is shown in the sight and on the radar visual display.

Operational Missions

The Luftwaffe fighter units are utilized in the following roles:

- Intercepts
- Combat air patrol (CAP)
- Air escort
- Fighter sweeps.

Mission execution is dependent not only on the performance parameters of the F-4F weapons system-flight performance, avionics and armament-but also on the support available at the time from the radar control service. Also in the future, fighter forces will be employed primarily under the control of the radar control service, as long as the air situation data and the available control (GCI) capacity are adequate. In a controlled mission, the fighters can be guided to the attack along the shortest flight path, placed in the most favorable position for the attack, and exploit the element of surprise. This makes the mission flown especially effective.

If the prerequisites for guided operations no longer exist, because of enemy actions or the development of the situation, the fighter forces operate autonomously in or from previously assigned combat zones (CAP).

In autonomous fighter operations, the fighter forces monitor and block the airspace from prescribed search loops. Since the bulk of the enemy's attack forces are expected to fly at low levels, the search loops are also planned primarily for this altitude range. The performance of the F-4F airborne radar at low altitudes dictates that the crew-pilot and WSO-monitor the assigned airspace visually for the most part. Depending on the situation, the search loops are so occupied with fighter aircraft as to permit the assigned airspace to be effectively blocked.

Autonomous fighter operations at low altitude plus a high level of demands on friendly fighter forces, since the effective blocking of an airspace by means of visual target searching is possible only when friendly fighter forces fly close together. Substantial resources are tied up in autonomous operations when carried out over an extended period and with systematic rotation of the fighter aircraft. Air escort and fighter sweeps are flown for support of friendly fighter-bomber missions. During air escort missions, the fighters stay very close to the friendly fighter-bombers and attack hostile aircraft if they pose a threat for their own unit.

During fighter sweeps, fighter aircraft-in close coordination with the mission of the fighter-bombers directly behind them comb a prescribed airspace over enemy territory and clear it of enemy aircraft.

Prospects for the Future

It can be assumed that in the future as well the Warsaw Pact will keep the edge that it currently has over NATO with respect to number of flying weapons systems, while simultaneously growing qualitatively through the introduction of new, and improvement of already introduced, weapons systems. It is thus absolutely imperative that our airborne air defense adapts itself to the threat. A medium-range threat accommodation is only possible through further improvement of the F-4F, and for the long term the replacement of the F-4F with a new fighter aircraft is urgently needed, so as to insure, also beyond the year 2000, a threat-equaling airborne air defense component with the simultaneously necessary reduction of personnel and materiel required in their operation. Whereas with the weapons systems now in the inventory the conduct of operations is in large measure determined by the performance and capabilities of the available weapons systems, it must be ascertained, in planning the future projects, namely:

- combat effectiveness enhancement of the F-4F and
- fighter aircraft 90 (Jagdflugzeug 90/JF 90),

how our conduct of operations is to develop in the future so as to meet the threat. From this will be determined the weapons systems improvements which will make the new conduct of operations possible.

Our current conduct of operations concept is characterized by the performance of the onboard radar at low levels plus the armament; in the future, our fighters, in both controlled and autonomous operations, are to operate primarily at medium and high altitudes and simultaneously higher than the targets. Following target acquisition at low altitude, several targets of the enemy formation are then engaged simultaneously with medium-range missiles. After the subsequent close air combat (dog fight) begins, the enemy will probably already be in a state of disorder as a result of the initial attack, the front of the formation will have been broken, and external strikes have been initiated. All in all, this conduct of operations concept promises the following advantages:

-The airspace can be monitored and blocked, even against hostile aircraft flying at low altitudes, with considerably fewer friendly aircraft than are required in the visual target search now being resorted to at low altitudes.

-The engagement is begun at a range which, because of the altitude and speed advantage of our fighters, does not allow effective enemy counter-fire in the first phase of the battle.

-Owing to the multiple target engagement capability, even a single fighter can hold its own against a formation of several hostile aircraft.

-The high-risk close air combat (dogfight) is conducted against a unit that is no longer tactically cohesive.

For the F-4F, the realization of the future conduct of operations concept means that the present onboard radar APQ-120 must be replaced by a modern onboard radar with the capability for

- large-area search and acquisition of targets in the entire operational spectrum, particularly at low altitudes and from above,
- simultaneous tracking of several targets,
- target identification at least within the range of the weapons,
- operations in an ECM environment.

In addition, the armament currently in use must be supplemented with an all-weather medium-range missile having a multiple target engagement capability.

For the enhancement of the combat effectiveness of the F-4F, the assessment and selection of a new onboard radar is currently under way. The AIM-120 AMRAAM, currently being developed in the U.S., is planned as the future medium-range missile.

The development of the conduct of operations concept begun with the F-4F, and the improvements in the onboard radar and armament resulting therefrom, also set the trend for the fighter aircraft 90 (JF90), where the possibility exists to harmonize, in a new design, flight performance and avionics in such a way as to permit the short and medium-range guided missiles ASRAAM and AMRAAM, currently under development, to be employed with optimum effectiveness. In addition, with the introduction of the JF 90, new ground-based weapons systems, and new elements of the control system, the possibility exists of discontinuing the rigid allocation of weapons engagement zones thus far in effect and to commit all air defense systems simultaneously in the same airspace, mutually complementing each other, and with considerably more effectiveness because of their combined employment.

The introduction of the JF 90 is planned for the second half of the 1990's.

12689
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SHIPBORNE ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS COMMENTED

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 20 Oct 84 pp 13-15

[Article by R.V.]

[Excerpt] The antimissile defense of warships until recently did not appear to be a specific and crucial problem for naval forces. However, the advent of the tactical missile--a self-propelled and guided weapon--goes back several decades. In the 1950s, the tactical missile was already included in air and naval arsenals, in its surface-to-air version which competed with traditional anti-aircraft artillery, in air-to-air and air-to-surface versions which competed with cannons, rockets and bombs. Next came the ship-to-ship missile, which was revealed to the public in 1967 by its hit on the Israeli frigate "Eliath" and which was to sound the reawakening of surface warfare that had fallen into disuse since the 1939-1945 war. But at the beginning of the 1970s, it still seemed utopian to attempt to destroy the missile itself; and the rule continued to be to attack the potential air or naval launcher.

In the meantime, the missile continued to increase in range and precision. From the stage of improved rocket, the missile moved on to the stage of an intelligent, electromagnetic or infrared self-guided missile capable of out-smarting countermeasures. Its trajectory was able to adopt increasingly varied profiles, from a high-altitude approach ending in sharp-angle descent to a low-angle attack a few meters above the surface of the sea. And, recently, it became associated with another kind of launcher, the submarine which for over a century had limited itself to a single weapon: the torpedo. Although the danger was increasingly better perceived by naval experts, it took the hits in 1982 by Argentine Exocet AM 39s on the "Sheffield" and "Atlantic Conveyor" to set off a general alarm. From then on, it has no longer been a question of attempting to destroy the launcher whatever it may be. The missile itself has to be considered a full-fledged enemy which should be treated as such.

Current antiship tactical missiles, in fact, have an average range of 70 km, that is 37 nautical miles. For a naval force, therefore, this threat is to be found in a circle around it with a circumference of 450 km and an area of 15,000 km². The neutralization of potential enemy launchers on such a front and in such an area calls for significant resources. Against airplanes, it is necessary to have medium-range anti-aircraft missiles (SAMP) or interceptors

aboard aircraft carriers. Against ships, attack aircraft, also shipborne aircraft, as seen, constitute the best combat weapon, if equipped with naval ship-to-ship missiles, provided their range is greater than enemy naval ship-to-ship missiles. Finally, combat against submarines in the area calls for a naval air ASM system, involving airplanes or helicopters and ships equipped with long-range listening systems. Even if an aircraft carrier is included in the force, it is not certain that the force will be able to guarantee 100 percent triple coverage: air, surface and ASM; all the more so, if the force does not have aircraft carriers. The antimissile self-defense of each ship is, therefore, an ineluctable necessity.

What kind of weapon should be selected for this purpose? Several solutions are in competition: the short-range, surface-to-air missile (SACP), the very short-range, surface-to-air missile (SATCP) and the small-caliber, multiple-barrel, rapid-fire cannon (4,000 rounds/minute). The SACP attempts to intercept the attacking missile as soon as possible after its initial detection. The SATCP and cannon on the other hand effect this interception at a much shorter distance; however, they have the advantage of greater simplicity.

The most unfavorable case is that of a missile attacking at very low altitude; the range of initial detection is then limited to the radar horizon, that is 20 kilometers. Current antiship missiles have a speed of about Mach 1, that is 1,250 km/h; but their immediate successors will be twice as fast. These 20 km are traversed by the missile in a space of time ranging from 30 seconds to 1 minute. No matter what self-defense system is selected, the periods between target acquisition and firing could, therefore, be extremely short (a few seconds), which implies the integral automatization of the entire launching sequence. For the SACP, account taken of the duration of the flight between departure and interception of the enemy missile (10 seconds), this will take place a mere 10 kilometers from the ship. Therefore, it is pointless to have a weapon with a very long range. As for the SATCP and the multiple-barrel, rapid-fire cannon, it is admitted that the minimal distance for the destruction of the enemy missile must be on the order of 1,000 to 1,500 m; their maximum range is generally from 2 to 5 km.

Most of the SACP and SATCP were initially designed as anti-aircraft weapons. To give them an antimissile capability, it was first necessary to improve the sensitivity of the detection and pursuit radars, account taken of the apparent small surface of the target (0.1 m^2 instead of the 2 m^2 of an airplane). It was also necessary to resolve the problem posed for the conduct of fire and guidance by the very low altitude of approach of the antiship missile. In fact, the sea reflects electromagnetic waves; and the pursuit radar runs the risk of locking onto the target's reflected image rather than onto the target itself. One solution consists in assuring that the antiship missile guidance system operates on the basis of detection of the infrared rays emitted by the target.

It is also possible to build a fire-direction radar whose radiation pattern has a very flat angle so as to avoid hitting the surface of the water.

In the self-defense sector, there are still other means: electronic jamming of the attacking missile's guidance system and "decoy" systems. These decoy systems are not intended to destroy the missile but "to deceive" it by attracting it to an artificial target put in place some distance from the ship under attack by means of rocket launchers. The payload of the rockets consists of either metal chaff which forms a cloud designed to have the missile's electromagnetic guidance system lock onto it or of high-intensity pyrotechnical missiles to "deceive" its infrared guidance system.

When all is said and done, the two current aspects of naval warfare described above are not mutually exclusive but are complementary. Shipborne aircraft permit intervention well beyond the range of shipborne weapons and attacks on potential missile launchers. But the specific antimissile self-defense of each ship has nonetheless become necessary. And the 1984 Naval Show will amply illustrate the importance now being accorded these two aspects of naval warfare by combat fleets.

8143
CSO: 3519/109

DECISION TO PURCHASE USED AIRCRAFT EXPLAINED

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 16 Nov 84 p 12

[Text] Escalation in the costs of defense equipment and materiel (with which Portugal obviously cannot keep pace) and the need to have a minimum of military resources capable of giving us essential international credibility as a state and a minimum of security and tranquility as a nation were the reasons given by the Armed Forces Chief of Staff [CEMGFA] for the purchase of 50 A-7P Corsair planes from the U.S. Navy and the American company, Vought, for the sum of 20.1 million contos.

Responding to criticism made by a weekly newspaper and an evening newspaper about Portugal's "disastrous deal" in purchasing 50 "obsolete" planes for "40 million contos," Lemos Ferreira pointed out at a press conference held at the EMGFA [Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters] that, in view of the high costs of defense equipment (for example, a B-1B plane costs 32 million contos per unit), many countries are now resorting to the modification, replacement and modernization of equipment which has already had several years of use and experience.

According to Lemos Ferreira, this attempt to prolong the useful service life of most of the weapons and equipment systems has of necessity a dual aspect: cost and efficiency. In fact, and again according to that official, the air force considered two basic questions before taking steps to re-equip its forces: first, does the present equipment serve the country? second, at what cost?

Re-equipping the Armed Forces

Once the operations in Africa were completed at the beginning of 1967, the then CEMGFA and president of the republic decided that the general staffs would study the structure of the forces and the minimum re-equipping of the armed forces with the following objectives: the attainment of a credible dissuasive military capability which would protect Portugal from a possible external military involvement under the theory that a possible aggressor would expect only reduced military and political means; and adaptation of that capability to an effective military participation in NATO at our level and within our possibilities.

In the case of the air force, due to the marked obsolescence of the equipment used in Africa in a situation characterized basically as counterguerrilla operations, it was rapidly decided that it was essential to put some hundreds of planes out of circulation inasmuch as they were devoid of any operational value on the European scene.

The initial phase aimed at a minimum re-equipping of the air force included two combat plane squadrons which were to be as multifunctional as possible, that is, capable of carrying out various kinds of missions--fire support and cooperation with naval surface and ground forces, barrage firing at the scene of a battle and dissuasive capability.

After various studies and analyses and taking into consideration the alternatives, the air force opted for the A-7 planes. Through a number of adaptations and the introduction of the most modern equipment, such as maneuvering flaps, avionics and new weapons systems, the A-7P emerged, a solution considered ingenious, less expensive, rational and adequate for our national requirements and circumstances.

The A-7 plane, whose manufacture was discontinued only recently, was originally designed and produced for carrying out maritime operations, continuing to be a part of the aircraft launched from American aircraft carriers. Through the years its unequalled success exceeded all initial expectations and it was finally adopted by the American Air Force.

Now, labeling such a plane as "scrap iron," Lemos Ferreira said, "denotes only the ill will of certain circles and a complete lack of technical knowledge about this equipment."

As for the numerous megalomaniac fantasies published by the above-mentioned newspaper, the EMGFA chief stated that the first squadron, comprising 20 planes, cost the state about 5.3 million contos, including spare parts, additional equipment, backup equipment and various kinds of weapons.

"These are the facts," asserted Lemos Ferreira, who, to say the least, opposes public disclosure of an alarmist nature and particularly the announcement that the air force allegedly purchased 50 obsolete planes for 40 million contos and that, in view of the enormous sum paid for the first 20 planes, the final bill could come to 100 million contos by 1986.

Lemos Ferreira then said that to the 5.3 million contos paid toward the purchase of the first squadron we must add about 14.8 million contos by August 1985 and that the 30 planes making up the second squadron will come to a total of 20.1 million contos.

"For anyone little acquainted with the problems of military defense, even this sum could appear high," Lemos Ferreira said, "but anyone who wishes to spend nothing or very little for defense, will end up losing his freedom, possessions and money."

8568
CSO: 3542/52

REPORT OF NAVY'S LONG-RANGE ROLE OBJECTIVES

Stockholm MARIN NYTT in Swedish no 5, 1984 pp 10-11

[Article by Goran Malais: "A Long Range View of the Navy"]

[Text] The supreme commander's "planning team" has, in connection with work on the ongoing perspective plan, studied future naval forces from three aspects: defense against coastal invasion, minelaying ability and surface ships.

Defense Against Coastal Invasion

The capabilities of naval warfare units are highly dependent on the mobility and vulnerability of the systems. Technical developments in reconnaissance and intelligence systems and in precision weapons mean that the vulnerability of all combat forces is increasing in varying degrees. Different tactical and technical measures are being taken in order to counteract as long as possible the development toward increased vulnerability.

Among the naval forces, submarines can in the future expect to maintain good capability to avoid enemy countermeasures. The submarine system has a high degree of survivability. The efficiency of its weapons is increasing. The system can be used for torpedo attack and minelaying and for reconnaissance missions. It will in the future be technically possible to equip submarines with missiles without reducing their torpedo capacity. Geographical circumstances will in certain situations limit their operational freedom of action.

Because of increases in weapon range, surface attack units can in more cases act in defense of our archipelago area. When the units are assembled in strength and put to sea, we must expect the risks of combat and the accompanying increased vulnerability. The units can be utilized for missile and torpedo attacks, minelaying, reconnaissance and escort missions. The ability to assemble rapidly in strength and great versatility are valuable properties in defense against invasion.

Heavy coastal defense missiles can utilize the terrain to oppose an attacker's superior detection and combat capabilities. They can be used to good effect in most areas around our coast.

The balance within naval warfare on the vulnerability aspect can be achieved in different ways. One way is to increase the protection for the surface attack units, for example, another is to increase the number of other naval warfare systems. During the work of the study group the latter course has been more closely analyzed. The results indicate that a certain increase in the number of submarines and coastal defense units can be a cost-effective measure if the effect against transport units is only being considered.

The possibilities to coordinate the time and space factors of the combat units should be improved. Common command and control systems should therefore be developed and procured.

The study has shown that the different naval warfare systems are required, and complement each other. The greatest possible operational freedom of action can be maintained if the organization consists of many different systems.

The Mine Warfare Mission

Mining is an important component in the defense against coastal invasion. It is significant even in neutrality. If we have a credible will and the ability to lay mines, the attacker is forced into tactical adaptations. Laid mines can mean that the attacker will choose another area for his landings, or be forced into time-consuming minesweeping. This latter gives us time, and forces the channelizing of the attacker, at the same time giving us freedom of action to deploy our forces in other directions.

Most mine systems are utilized in the immediate vicinity of our coastal zone, where the possibilities for defense of our mining forces are the greatest.

Mine systems consist of controlled and uncontrolled mines. Most controlled mines are laid in peacetime. They can be readied for action quickly. The development of the threat has demonstrated shortcomings in the system. Technology, however, gives good conditions for improving the system. The effect of uncontrolled mines depends on a sufficient number being laid out. Mine-layers must therefore either have a large cargo capacity and good speed capability, or be many in number. To a certain extent these requirements can be reduced by development of new self-propelled and target-seeking mine types.

Alternative minelaying possibilities can be guaranteed by utilizing all naval ships and some civilian ferries as minelayers after mobilization. In case of a surprise attack, minelaying must be carried out primarily by regular naval ships.

Surface Ships for Peace, War and Neutrality

Certain types of activity place special demands on the weapons and detection equipment of warships. The aggressor must understand that our forces constitute a real threat to his activity. Only thereby can we achieve a deterrent effect.

Antisubmarine warfare has so far required relatively large ships in order to accomodate the sophisticated detection and weapons systems which are required. Technology has, however, made it possible today to equip relatively small ships with effective weapons. The coastal corvettes now under production are an example of that.

The study tested whether it is appropriate to further expand the antisubmarine requirement in ships. Such a measure would mean that the ships must be considerably larger and more expensive. The negative results in reducing the number of ships are not offset by the better performance of a larger ship.

During peacetime crises and neutrality, a large number of the actions will probably not be antisubmarine in nature. Even in such situations, however, it is of great importance to appear on the scene with systems which create respect. This can be accomplished by having participating ships cooperate with attack aircraft and coast artillery units. In many situations, however, it is advantageous if the participating unit is equipped to deliver effective fire itself. Accordingly that is a force in which the majority of the surface ships are equipped with effective weapon systems even in crises and neutrality situations.

Actions during peacetime and neutrality and the demands of war include a requirement for powerful units in sufficient numbers. So far this requirement has been satisfied by a mix of ships of varying quality. Qualified units must, in order to satisfy the requirement for the numbers of units, be supplemented with a number of simpler types of ships. The balance between ships with high and somewhat lower qualities must therefore be tested. Today it is most urgent to quickly satisfy the requirement for a sufficient number of antisubmarine ships.

Navy Tactical Control Systems Being Converted

The navy's present system of combat control ashore, in the fleet and in the coast artillery was built up beginning in the 1950's. The system is based on the voice transmission of information from radar stations and other information sources to manual plots in combat information centers. Reporting between centers is handled in the same way.

Requirements of High Speed Combat and New Materiel

The ability of the combat information and control system, during high speed combat and in a difficult telecommunications environment, to present a good foundation for the control of units is unsatisfactory. The system is demanding of personnel, and is difficult to adapt to newly acquired materiel.

Beyond the shortcomings of the combat control system, the chief of naval operations has confirmed that the navy's land-based radar stations partly need to be replaced with new equipment and reorganized for greater efficiency.

Electronic Tactical Control Equipment

On certain ships, different types of electronic plotting equipments have already been installed. Examples are ELPLO on Norrkoping-class torpedo boats, ARTE 726 on patrol boats and the NIBS system on submarines.

MARIN NYTT has previously reported on the maritime control centers with computer-aided equipment to collect, process, present and communicate information on the situation at sea.

Future Tactical Control System

During the 70's and the beginning of the 80's, because of reduced appropriations, available funds have been used to try to maintain the strength and effectiveness of the combat units. For this reason an imbalance has arisen between weapons systems and control systems.

In order to improve the ability of the control systems, the following steps and projects are being undertaken in the navy:

- Development of Project MASIK (computer-aided naval combat control system in wartime).
- Carrying out Project STRIKA 85 (computer-aided combat control for coast artillery units).
- Procurement of new radar equipment as replacement for coast surveillance radar (PS 239) and tower radar (PS 15).
- Increased cooperation between the navy's coastal surveillance radar stations and the coast artillery's close surveillance radar stations, and procurement of new radar materiel for these purposes.
- Procurement and installation of computer-aided tactical control systems for coastal corvettes and missile boats, minesweeping craft of the Landsort-class and HKP 4.

Beginning with this issue, MARIN NYTT is going to orient its readers in a series of articles concerning the above steps and projects.

9287
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PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS OF FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SURVEYED

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 12 Oct 84 pp 56-72

[Article: "The Revolution Takes Hold"]

[Text] Factories are changing over--as the second industrial revolution picks up speed. But things which have for a long time been technically possible are often still too expensive.

Human beings are superfluous. Conveyor vehicles move about in the lanes between assembly stations as though impelled by ghostly hands. Industrial robots inflexibly execute the motions which have been programmed into them. "It's all very spooky." Thus Professor Hans Juergen Warnecke, manager of the Fraunhofer Institute for Production Technology and Automation (ITA) in Stuttgart, summarizes the impressions received by an observer of engine production as carried out by the Japanese machine tool manufacturer Fanuc Ltd.

Although not yet at such a level of perfection as this in Japan nevertheless everywhere in the industrialized world the factory of the future is becoming an actuality. To professional interpreters of trends our society is on the threshold of a second industrial revolution which will substantially break down all traditional factory structures. This development has been initiated by and carried forward by the microprocessor which--now riper and cheaper--is giving rise to automation on an undreamed-of scale. Automation was still equivalent to mechanization 1.5 decades ago. Automation meant maximizing the efficiency of a gigantic capital-intensive complex of assembly lines and specialized machines. In accordance with the "scientific management" developed in the early part of this century by the American Frederick Winslow Taylor, factory work was divided up into many small steps in which the human being at the side of the machine could only prolong his working life by filling in the gaps left by automation.

This organization by subdividing labor into the minutest detail achieved in appropriate forms of mass production economic results which were unbeatable--as in the automobile industry. Thus it became the basis of our consumer society. Of course, the disadvantage of this organization through "time study" was its total loss of flexibility. If a new product or even a variant of a product were introduced the manufacturing process would no longer be relevant since the product-specific information was firmly bound up as hardware with the given installation.

Since about 75 percent of production, for example, in the metal-working trade, involves relatively small batches and conversions to other product variants are the order of the day, for reasons of cost it was never possible for efficiency to become established in most factories.

This is now passe. Progress in microelectronics has now made it possible for motion to be guided electronically rather than mechanically and this has made flexible manufacturing possible and permits the introduction of industrial automation even for small batch sizes.

The core of a flexible manufacturing system is the processing station which is equipped with a computer and which depending upon the program employed is capable of autonomously running specific processing operations. When several of these processing stations are coupled together one obtains a flexible manufacturing system (FFS) which by means of an integrated automatic system of transport and manipulation supplies its own tools and workpieces and removes them. Guidance and control is accomplished here through a computer system. While it is true that the investment costs of a flexible manufacturing system are 20 to 40 percent above the cost of a conventional manufacturing facility nevertheless the components of a flexible manufacturing system can be reorganized and reused after termination of one production sequence just like the components of a modular construction system.

It is not only the technical capabilities available which make this revolution in manufacturing technologies possible. The market, too, is increasingly exerting pressure in the direction of a reorientation of manufacturing. Thus ever more demanding customer wishes are accelerating product innovation; they demand a greater variety of models and intensify their demands in terms of delivery time and quality. Speaking for the consumer goods industry Rudolf Koeberle, member of the board of directors of Grundig AG, makes the complaint that "the technological tempo is in permanent acceleration. Product cycles which in the beginning of our company's history encompassed a number of years have now shortened during the sixties and the seventies to 3 and even 2 years and in the eighties to 1 year and there are now plenty of examples of substantial technological change in products during a period even less than 1 year."

Industry accepts the challenges of the dynamic market. Everywhere in the world enterprises are investing in flexible technologies in order to be able to react quickly in terms of production technique to new market trends. In the FRG the fraction of enterprises whose investments serve to introduce new production and process technologies has increased to almost 60 percent. "We are facing a boom in innovation," comments Wolfgang Gerstenberger of the Munich Ifo Institute for Economic Research. Hence order books in the area of machine construction are correspondingly well-filled. "This is a reflection of the breakthrough into flexible automation," happily declares Otto Schiele, president of the German Machine and Plant Construction Association (VDMA), and he paints a better competitive picture over the long term for the capital goods branch of machine construction.

And it is high time. As a result of investment weakness following the petroleum crisis in the beginning of the seventies the machinery in the FRG has

become visibly antiquated. The level of modernity in the metal-working trades, that is, the percentage of facilities which have not been written off, has slumped from 62 percent in 1970 to 56 percent in 1982. In the United States the picture is similar. There every third machine tool attains a biblical age of more than 20 years and in England every fourth machine has been in operation for 20 years. Only Japan can avail itself of a younger machine shop. Only 18 percent of the machine tools there are older than 20 years. And 61 percent of the machines have been put into operation only in the last 10 years.

The cornerstone of the new computer-controlled manufacturing technologies had already been laid as early as the beginning of the fifties and sixties. It was then that the first numerically controlled machine tool emerged, developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and it was then that the first computer-controlled robots were exhibited and also it was then--likewise in America--that the first experiments in computer-based design were undertaken.

Consequently, the individual components are already well-known techniques. The propulsive force of the factory of the future is now coming from the integration of all these elements such as numerically controlled machine tools, industrial robots, automatic transport systems and fully automated shelf storage. But up to now the production process has consisted of two parallel subsystems: integration is nothing but the fusion of material processing and information processing. Material flow and the flow of information are embedded in a well-balanced system so that finally "the right quantity of goods is produced at the right time for an existing demand," in the words of Jan Carlsson of the Computer and Electronics Commission in Stockholm.

The search for information and the acquisition of information consequently need no longer be left to haphazard human behavior. Therefore the hopes of industrial strategists have fixed upon the Kuerzel CIM. CIM stands for computer-integrated manufacturing and describes the all-encompassing use of modern computer technologies in flexible automation.

Building upon a common data bank, there are combined under CIM's umbrella data processing systems for development and design (CAD), manufacturing planning (CAP), control of machines, facilities and processes (CAM), quality control (CAQ) and sometimes additional industrial areas. This combination breaks through conventional boundaries of classical organizational functional areas. Development, design, manufacturing and the management of materials grow together and this requires a uniform style of thinking not only on the part of management but also on the part of all qualified employees.

The task confronting CIM is scarcely an enviable one: the goal is to coordinate the hardware, software, data banks and communications systems in the factory in such a manner as to assure a cost-optimal assembly line production, analogous to that in the processing industry, from the design stage right up to assembly.

In the meantime the theory is a gray area. Just the transition to partially integrated solutions such as CAD/CAM creates in practice enormous engineering and organizational problems. It is true that one hears lots of talk about

integrated computer-supported design and manufacturing but at the present time in the entire world there are known to be at most 10 to 20 integrated CAD/CAM systems which are capable of going the whole route from design to manufacturing by digital electronics. As recently announced in an investigatory report by the Industrial Engineering Administration of German Industry, there exists an even more confusing multiplicity of hardware and software crowding into the market under the title of CAD/CAM. But among all these there is not to be found any sufficiently matured system capable of guiding the designer's pencil in all phases of model geometry, capable of producing from that the parts lists, capable of planning work and of developing a manufacturing process and finally of producing the program required by numerically controlled machines.

Even the setting up of flexible manufacturing systems cannot be just shaken out of one's sleeve. The time schedule for the production of the flexible manufacturing system in the Friedrichshafen Gear Factory AG demonstrates the difficulty of implementing the new technologies. There it took as much as 5 years to accomplish the transformation from workshop manufacturing to the organization of 14 interlinked manufacturing cells. The difficulties arose from the relative multiplicity of various designs and variants of the product--the gear boxes which during manufacture necessitate differing sequences of processing. The old production process had to be completely transformed, the various processing sequences had to be combined into manufacturing cells in order to process the workpieces--organized in parts families--on an assembly line basis. But the flexibility achieved is impressive: the workpieces can be changed daily, even hourly and the batch sizes vary between 50 and 500 units.

But why this expenditure of effort? "The most important argument would be the shorter run-through time," declares Erwin Ziebart who is in charge of technology in Friedrichshafen. "We want to be able to install a gear train ordered in the evening into the truck the next morning. That would be hardly possible with a conventional system," says Ziebart in justifying this technological pioneering. And there is another advantage: shorter run-through times require less storage, thus liberating capital which up to now had been unproductive.

The flexible manufacturing facility in Friedrichshafen has been promoted by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology as a pilot facility. Users of this technology who lack such state support must move fast with their investment--a single flexible cell is scarcely obtainable for less than 1.5 million marks--if the cost is to be recovered. "Then the full utilization of the machines becomes the decisive factor," reckons Siegfried Hofmann, assistant in the management of the Swabian machine tool manufacturer Trumpf GmbH and Company. "At 200 marks per machine hour the installation must run, run and run again." On all three shifts preferably.

In manufacturing at Trumpf this has already become a reality. The six smaller flexible manufacturing systems installed there are working round the clock. Since it is often hard to obtain qualified personnel for a 24-hour operation at economically acceptable cost the factories are compelled to arrange their production so as to make possible a largely low-personnel operation at a high

level of reliability in terms of machine breakdown. But this necessitates extensive automation of the periphery. In order to fully exploit automation it is necessary to give up automated insular procedures and as quickly as possible replace them with more comprehensive combined procedures. This involves a change in fundamental economic principles: in an extreme case the ratio of fixed cost to manufacturing cost rises to 100 percent. Hence the "economics of scale" principle--the reduction of cost as a function of higher batch sizes--becomes less and less important.

Under the conditions of flexible automation different products can be profitably produced together since the setup times--otherwise the most costly element in conventional manufacture at low batch sizes--diminish with increasing levels of flexibility. Therefore the factory of the future will be in a position to sharply expand the number of products and product variants produced without incurring additional cost. "The old conflict between manufacturing and sales over product variants will be resolved," prophesized Professor Guenter Spur, chief of the Institute for Machine Tools and Manufacturing Technique at the Technical University of Berlin.

But there still remains this conflict of goals. We are dealing now with a new manufacturing concept which starts with the design of a roughed-out product which is independent of the particular model and which is subsequently tailored to suit the customer's wishes at a point in time which is as late as possible--perhaps not until it has reached the delivery depot. In this way it is also possible to react quickly to changed market conditions.

While it is already possible to achieve a high degree of flexibility in processing through the use of modern computer-controlled machines, there are still substantial obstacles to be overcome in achieving a flexible automation of assembly. Such peripheral elements as calipers, storage magazines and classifying devices still lack the changeover flexibility possessed by industrial robots. For the peripheral elements involve sensors as well as control devices. But even by 1985 according to an estimate of the Stuttgart Fraunhofer Institute for Production Technology and Automation (IPA), fully automatic programmable assembly systems will be set up in conjunction with industrial robots. The people in Stuttgart are reckoning with over 100 such situations by the year 1988.

Apart from some special problems, the factory of the future is today already state of the art. "Perhaps the only thing still lacking is a fully developed sensor technique," says Professor Walter Eversheim, specialist for automation technologies at the Rhineland-Westphalia Technical Advanced School in Aachen. "Otherwise the limits are purely economic." Thus the competitive capability of flexible manufacturing systems as compared with human labor power is largely determined by the amount of time required to produce the software for a specific product. If the life cycle of the product is less than the time required to produce the software then obviously conventional manufacturing is the superior procedure.

Basically the achievement of the unmanned factory depends upon the conditions of development of wage and capital costs required by a continuous program of

automation. While the release of one employee merely yields a linear reduction in wage costs, the resultant capital costs increase exponentially. "For this reason it will be extraordinarily difficult," says Professor Nam P. Suh of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "to justify the existence of completely unmanned factories."

Nevertheless, the more highly evolved and inexpensive these technologies become the greater will be the competitive pressure to employ the new flexible techniques, particularly since in addition to cost arguments they can also offer such advantages as uniform quality and reliable scheduling. "Nothing is gained by waiting" is the warning offered to indecisive entrepreneurs by the innovation expert Horst Wildemann, professor of manufacturing science in plant and industry at the University of Passau. Moreover, "the new technologies demand a considerable fund of experience which cannot be bought but which must be laboriously acquired by the user through an accumulation of knowledge." Initially, this experience is gained at the expense of overall productivity because in the startup phase the user encounters substantial additional costs resulting from increased expense for planning and personnel.

For this reason many plants hesitate to change their production over to flexible automation. In particular, there are many small and medium-sized factories which have a hard time making the change. But Bonn is helping out. Anxious lest our manufacturing industry, which is primarily in small business, lose ground in international competition the FRG has embarked on an extensive support program which provides 530 million marks for the period from 1984 to 1987. This support program aims primarily at the industrial use of computer-controlled systems in manufacturing technology as well as the development of industrial robots and manipulatory devices.

"Have things really reached the point in the FRG where new technologies can succeed only with the help of subsidies?" This critical question put by the business consulting firm of Roland Berger and Partner GmbH nevertheless fails to label German entrepreneurs as backward when it comes to innovation. Because in other great industrial countries generous subsidies are being provided and the key importance of this manufacturing technology in international competition is understood.

The United States within the framework of its air force program is making available about \$300 million for the development of CAD/CAM systems, flexible manufacturing installations and robots. The Japanese Government is spending the sum of 330 million marks annually for flexible manufacturing systems and the French Government is providing as much as 4.1 billion francs for technology transfer. Even the Thatcher government which ordinarily talks so much of free market forces is subsidizing the changeover to CAD systems, robots and flexible manufacturing with much more than 100 million pounds a year out of the state treasury.

It is no wonder that in this artificial greenhouse atmosphere the market is growing explosively. The sale of computer-controlled equipment capital goods just by American and European firms climbed from \$1.2 billion in 1982 to \$1.6 billion in 1983. For this year the estimates are assuming a growth rate of 43 percent and sales are expected to leap to a record height of \$2.3 billion.

The German manufacturers who only 2 years ago were loudly complaining about their loss of international competitive capability are now quite visible in the marketplace with their customary self-confidence. "None of the approximately 18 German large-scale projects for flexible manufacturing which are still in the planning phase will pass into the hands of non-European competitors," is the assurance of Helmut Hamer, business manager of the established Berlin firm Fritz Werner Machine Tools GmbH. In fact, the individual demands of these complex manufacturing systems are evidently congenial to the Germans. The Japanese competitors, accustomed to producing cheap standardized equipment, cannot keep pace when it comes to specially tailored equipment. The machine construction expert Eversheim summarizes his impressions in saying "the German competitive advantage consists not in the individual components of manufacturing technology, since in robot technology the Americans and the Japanese are undoubtedly the leaders, but rather in the production of systems immediately ready for use."

Among users of this equipment the technology-fascinated Japanese are distinctly out front. Of the approximately 200 flexible manufacturing systems installed worldwide about one-third are in Japanese enterprises. Japan, after Sweden, has the highest robot population; 25 percent of Japanese machine construction factories use CAD systems. By way of comparison, in the FRG the figure is only 2 to 3 percent. "It makes one positively uneasy to see how consistently the Japanese are applying the new technologies," declares IPA staff member Manfred Schweizer.

In the meantime the production shops of such successful machine tool manufacturers as Fanuc and Yamazaki have come to be cult shrines of technologists from all over the world. The status of technology there impresses the technologists but nevertheless leaves massive doubt as to the economic merit of these ostentatious projects. One thing is certain: the Germans, too--though without so much publicity exploitation--have a sensational project. This is the manufacture of the Tornado at the Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm Company in Augsburg which, in terms of flexibility and integration, is considered to be a model for the world.

But the value of such pilot projects for most factories is nevertheless being disputed. Joachim Poeppel, member of the board of the Heidelberg Printing Machines Company, has said "What is important is not so much expensive process innovations but rather a purposeful advance step by step within one total concept."

Despite all differences of opinion as to the speed with which the substitution of labor and capital will proceed, no one questions the fact that the process of decoupling man and machine is going forward. The end of the line for this progress will be the fully automatic superfactory which just like an airplane will be driven only by a small highly trained team at one control panel. As the development of communications technology progresses it is also possible to conceive, according to Professor Spur, a model of the "decentralized factory" in which the manufacturing islands are operated by individual workers or by groups of workers linked together. Or one may imagine the following situation: In order to deal with the high investment costs of computer-controlled flexible

manufacturing one requires an economic effort which is no longer possible for average-sized enterprises. And thus for cost reasons it would appear logical for "several enterprises to support one flexible manufacturing facility" (Spur). Or: The conventional form of enterprise may be broken up in favor of two separately operating parts: the computer-integrated, highly flexible automated factory on the one hand and an enterprise having a purely marketing orientation on the other hand.

No matter how fantastic our visualization of the organizational future of the factory may be, for the technologist the stormy years of the breakthrough must be followed by sober day-to-day operations. It is the judgment of Wolfgang Zeppelin, chief of design and development in the Traub Machine Factory GmbH, that "the next 10 years, seen from the point of view of technology, are certain to be less exciting than the last 10 years." He is right, but it is the correct configuration of this day-to-day operation and the continuous implementation of the new technologies which will determine whether or not in 10 years enterprises will continue to exist in the marketplace.

In the next part of this article: how the new manufacturing technology creates inhumane jobs--and why something must be done about this.

8008

CSO: 3620/84

NATIONAL GOLD RESERVES: TO SELL OR NOT

Lisbon 0 JORNAL 19 Oct 84 p 36

[Text] Cheap gold "cost" another 45 million to the budget. If Portugal were to have sold at the present time any part of its 635,575 tons, it would have gotten a bad deal, since the current quotation for the yellow metal in international markets is the lowest in years. Yet in deciding not to sell, the government did not avoid another inconvenience: the worsening of the state budget deficit by 45 million contos.

At the present time, an ounce of gold is quoted at about 340 dollars, that is, 27 less than the 367 it was reported at the beginning of the year.

According to the report of the Bank of Portugal, on December 31, 1983 Portuguese gold reserves were conservatively estimated at about 685 million contos, using a quotation lower than the international market, fixed on that date by the Central Bank at 254 dollars per troy ounce, equivalent to 31.1035 grams.

In strict accounting terms, the current value of the gold reserves on deposit in the Bank of Portugal is somewhere around one billion contos, but that is a purely academic hypothesis, since any attempt to unload large quantities of the yellow metal could precipitate an even greater drop in the international quotation.

For those favoring the sale of gold as a way to pay the foreign debt, 1980 would have been the year in which such an operation, theoretically, would have been the most favorable, since the ounce at that time got up as high as 800 dollars.

The way the experts figure it, if that government, with Cavaco Silva running the Finance portfolio, had sold half the existing reserves, that would have been enough to pay off the entire foreign debt. But even in that case, the hypothesis would have been academic, given the risk of a drop in the quotation brought about by the sale of hundreds of tons of the metal.

Today the situation is substantially different, both because the Portuguese foreign debt has doubled in the last three years, while the gold quotation represents only 43 percent of its "record" value of 1980.

But according to a source close to the staff of the finance minister, another factor is said to have influenced the government not to sell any gold at this time. The decision took into account present expectations for a deficit in the balance of current accounts below the forecast at the beginning of the current fiscal year.

According to that source, instead of a deficit of around 1.25 billion dollars, the balance of accounts could end up with a negative figure between 800 million and 1.0 billion dollars.

In such circumstance, the source stated, the government preferred to "ride out the storm" which would naturally be unleashed in the face of an increase in the deficit of the 1984 Budget of State, translated into an additional "gap" of 45 million contos, which raised the negative balance to 249.5 million.

12430
CSO: 3542/036

BRIEFS

BANKRUPTCIES RISE--In the first six months of this year, the total number of business bankruptcies was 88, representing an increase of 31 percent over the corresponding period of the previous year, as reported by the Credit Insurance Company (COSEC). In 1983, total bankruptcies for the entire year were 129, whereas in 1982 they did not exceed 101. The average capital stock of the bankrupt companies is around 4,000 contos, and the average number of employees of each was about 50, which taken together with the average capital stock indicates that the companies affected are mostly of medium size. Broken down according to the type of business, the "textiles and clothing" manufacturing industry shows the greatest number of bankruptcies during the six months under review -- 18.2 percent of the total. Of the remaining sectors, which present variations of little significance, the only observation of note is a worsening in the industry and commerce of "food and beverages." [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 17] 12430

WOMEN'S EARNINGS BELOW MINIMUM--About two thirds of Portuguese working women make less than 15,000 escudos per month, according to a 1983 survey reported to EXPRESSO by the Commission on the Feminine Condition (CCF), concerning the difference in wages paid to men and women. The national minimum wage is 15,300 escudos. The survey, which was limited to firms of over 10 employees, excluding public services and farming activities, showed that only 9.6 percent of women earn an average salary higher than 30,000 escudos, while men who earn this salary level exceed 16.5 percent. The Commission also noted that salary differences according to qualification levels are 22.3 percent less for women in skilled trades and 24.4 percent for semiskilled workers. CCF officials attribute this fact to the idea that women do not need to work, and only the growing economic crisis starting in the seventies has led women to go outside the home to help guarantee, together with their husbands, better financial support for their families. Figures for 1982 made available by the commission taking into account rates of economic activity according to marital status show that the greater percentage of women with fixed jobs and earnings are the unmarried (60.4%) and the divorced and separated (68.8%). [Excerpts] [Lisbon EXPRESSO 20 Oct 84 p 4] 12430

1983 BANK UNION REPORT--The report released a few days ago by the Union of Portuguese Banks (UBP) mentions that "1983 was not a propitious year for the development of activity by banking institutions in Portugal," with the bottom line for the year reaching 89.7 thousand contos. Operating profit was 66.3 thousand contos, and the balance of the profit and loss account was 23.3 thousand contos. Credit extended by the UBP increased 14.4 percent in relation to 1982, absorbing only 54.8 percent of funds deposited, which by December 31, 1983, had reached 184.5 million contos, representing an increase of 16.7 percent. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Oct 84 p 5] 12430

PETROGAL EARNINGS POOR--The high tax burden which PETROGAL [Portuguese Petroleum Corporation] had to bear in 1983 resulted in net earnings for the fiscal period of only 200,000 contos, the second poorest in the past 5 years. According to the firm's financial statement, now published, although the gross earnings were on the plus side to the tune of 4.7 million contos (higher than in 1982) in current results for the period, in actuality the net earnings after tax deductions were only 200,000 contos. The statement is an indication that the tax law in effect is inadequate under present economic-financial conditions in that it does not accept the provision for potential exchange differentials as part of the cost of the exercise; thus, the sum of 4.3 million contos was included in the collectible items. [Text] [Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 16-22 Nov 84 p 17] 8568

CSO: 3542/52

AGRICULTURE MINISTER ROMERO ON EEC TALKS

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 28 Nov 84 p 5

[Interview with Carlos Romero, Spanish Minister of Agriculture; Madrid, date not specified]

[Text] [Question] What is the status of the negotiations with the EEC and under what conditions is Spain joining in the latest round of negotiations in Brussels?

[Answer] This negotiating session is very important because it should come close to or even settle the industrial issues, and bring us closer to agreement on issues affecting the fishing industry. However, there are basic questions regarding agricultural items, such as wine and olive oil, on which Spain has already stated its position, where hopes for a settlement are still premature. In other areas we find ourselves facing a divergence between the Community's positions and Spain's. Progress is not occurring as fast as might have been expected a few months ago, but I believe this is because the EEC itself has serious internal disagreements and also because it is maintaining a very cautious stance in the negotiations. I think that fears about Spain's commercial importance have been exaggerated and that this has elicited very defensive attitudes in some countries.

The issues on which positions are the farthest apart concern the sensitivity of the citrus industry and the terms the EEC is seeking to impose on fruits and vegetables, terms that Spain in turn is proposing for the rest of the continent's products. In our opinion, there is one sector that should enjoy all of the protective mechanisms, and that is the dairy industry. Progress has been made on this point and the EEC is willing to grant the maximum concessions.

Fishing Concerns Ready for Settlement

[Question] What is the situation concerning the fishing industry at this moment?

[Answer] The differences have been very great. This issue is also considered very difficult to reach an agreement. However, following a tour of several North European countries, many obstacles to agreement on various aspects of

this question have been resolved. I am moderately optimistic about the possibility of reaching an agreement more quickly than we had thought possible. The basic difference is the transitional period. The EEC seeks a period of 10 to 15 years, while we favor a term of 7 years. I believe that our position will win. After that, small differences separate us, such as access to waters off the Irish coast, or the conflict over French fishing grounds. Except for that, and this area is very extensive and of vital importance to Spain, obstacles to agreement on the issues have been fairly well removed on the level of bilateral and commission relations. The only thing left to do is to state our acceptance of the agreement.

[Question] Does the fact that five Spanish ministers are meeting with their French counterparts in Paris this weekend imply progress?

[Answer] That meeting is part of ongoing contacts that several of our ministers have maintained with various Common Market countries during the past few weeks. It is also in line with talks I have had with seven of my counterparts in agriculture and five in fishing, as well as with contacts with Boyer, Almunia and Carlos Solchaga have made. As part of this strategy, we have achieved agreement with two or three ministers, as happened in the FRG. We sought to take advantage of this round of talks to state our position to the French side and to continue to press on some issues. Our objective is for the French people to give instructions to their delegation to move on some of the contents of the negotiations.

[Question] Does France continue to be the principal obstacle to our entry?

[Answer] No. Each country is raising difficulties about products that affect them. Sometimes it is not even a whole country, but just regions. They are negotiating from hard-line positions because in general they are seeking to justify internal readjustments by citing the talks with Spain. The EEC is a very complex commercial mechanism with remarkable systems of production and significant budgetary weight. But it also has some very serious surpluses. Every year it is harder to reach medium-range agreements, and they are very much influenced by day to day conditions. In this complex, world, the incorporation of a country with an agricultural industry as important as Spain's leads to significant modifications. You realize that many countries want to have you as an ally in the EEC later, along one line or another, and they invite you to participate in future discussions.

[Question] In this final stretch, has the community's negotiating position hardened?

[Answer] We are all negotiating from a hard line. Beyond statements about Spain's incorporation, which is accepted as a fact, negotiations within the different economic spheres are extremely tough. These have nothing to do with prices or regulations, and we must bear in mind that the Community negotiators have had the difficult experience of four previous expansions.

The EEC is trying to be prudent, to tie up lots of loose ends and to leave issues unencumbered. Also, Spanish agrarian sectors are exerting very strong pressure on the administration, just as groups in other countries are exerting pressure on their governments. This is normal and it cannot be any different.

No Alternative

[Question] Some interested sectors, as well as the opposition itself, have on occasion criticized the negotiating criteria of the present team. Is there an alternative?

[Answer] Outside of tactical positions, there is full agreement on this issue. There are no other negotiating alternatives, and if there were, I wish someone would explain them to me. We should not forget, either, that the basic documents existed prior to this government. With regard to previous positions, perhaps special emphasis has been placed in recent months on offering the maximum protection to the least protected sectors. Before 1982, emphasis was placed, somewhat naively, on the stronger sectors or those with the capacity to export, not on the ones that needed protection more. This is perhaps the only important change with regard to the previous government's negotiating strategies. We have held dozens of meetings with the agricultural sector every time there was a document or a response from the EEC, or upon our return from any trip, and I can say that there are no other strategies.

[Question] What attitude is the government maintaining during this last phase?

[Answer] This government has no complexes on an international level, because we have no need for any democratic confirmation, nor do we have any need on a technical level. We have an extensive technical establishment which has been preparing in Common Market areas for many years, which knows its legislation very well, which has spent much time in Brussels and is very well known by the Community. Because of this, we do not suffer from any complexes or feelings of inferiority.

What we have made clear is that without certain minimum guarantees on agricultural, fishing or industrial questions, the treaty cannot be signed in accordance with national interests. From that perspective, we are negotiating calmly enough, although it is not easy to resist the pressures of a society that thinks that something is going to be settled in every session.

[Question] Are you, nonetheless, pressured by the government?

[Answer] No. I think this is very clear and it is something that all of us, including the prime ministry, have been repeating ever since June. We are not influenced by anything, and I have the impression that they are beginning to believe us. Of course, there is no pressure from the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] congress either. Proof of this is that it will be held, and we will continue negotiating. Actually, the only thing that influences us is the contents of the negotiations. We are not obsessed with dates.

[Question] Could the record agricultural production this year add any difficulties to the negotiations?

[Answer] The EEC has very good information about us. This is normal. We also know all about their production, their cycles and whether they have had a good year or a bad one. The commission's technical teams do not base their opinions merely on whether the business climate is good or bad. In the Community, what impresses them more is that we have succeeded in implementing production policies and meeting objectives for sectors that were experiencing growth, as well as those that were suffering decline.

[Question] What is the situation with the "green conversion"?

[Answer] This whole type of process is always a medium-range proposal. I think at this time we have a more balanced agricultural economy than does the Community itself. They suffer from more deficits and also more surpluses at the same time. They produce too much grain, butter and dairy products, wine and vegetable oil. Our own agricultural industry does not suffer from these imbalances. We will continue to follow the same path, and that means continuing along the same lines within the EEC. We have the advantage in that part of this process will be accomplished with Community funds, which is an important factor for us.

[Question] Is there final confirmation of January 1986 as the date of Spain's entry into the Common Market?

[Answer] This is their starting point and it is recognized by all the member states. The big contradiction is that the data seems reasonable to both parties and no one has mentioned changing it, but the problem is that meanwhile, the sectoral negotiations are only progressing as best they can. If the EEC were to agree to 95 percent of our positions, I would sign an agreement right now. But at present, the distance separating us is much greater, and we cannot conclude the negotiations yet.

[In box] Down With Complexes

According to Carlos Romero, the effects of Spain's integration into the EEC will cease to be noticed beyond a period of 6 to 10 years. Over the short term, there may be effects in the area of prices or business fluctuations, but still it is to be hoped that "it will be beneficial for the Spanish economy and agricultural industry to move into a much broader competitive market than the present one."

According to the minister, competition will provide an incentive for specialization "and it will erase many historical complexes from this country. It is likely that we will discover that there are business sectors that are much more dynamic than people think and that certain protectionist fears which have burdened us for centuries will be shown to have had little reason for existing."

Carlos Romero is convinced that "this is the first time in this nation's history when the European option triumphed because--also for the first time--an absolute majority of Spanish society believes that our historic destiny is linked to the destiny of this continent."

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CSO: 3548/59

DROP IN PRIVATE SECTOR STEEL PRICES TO TRIM STOCKS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 23 Nov 84 p 6

[Report by Bayram Basaran]

[Text] Iron and steel manufacturers in the private sector have launched a major price campaign against imports. Price cuts of as much as 15 Turkish liras per kilogram in the Istanbul wholesale market last week prompted criticism from wholesalers and end users.

Ragip Cingillioglu, a partner in the Cingillioglu Steel Trading Corporation, said that the primary purpose of the 15-lira price cuts announced by the Colakoglu Metallurgy Corporation and the Cukurova Metallurgy Corporation on pig iron is to halt steel imports and that the said firms will raise their pig iron prices as soon as steel imports are halted. Cingillioglu said:

"Restrictions on construction steel imports were lifted last month as a result of temporary high demand and an abnormal hike in construction steel prices by private sector firms. However, when iron and steel producers in the private sector realized that they cannot compete with the very low prices of the imports they decided to cut pig iron prices by 15 Turkish liras per kilogram overnight. The primary purpose of this price cut is to halt imports abruptly and to recapture the market. It is a fact that steel prices will begin rising again in the coming days. Following price cuts by private sector firms, steel prices dropped to about 135 Turkish liras [per kilogram] from about 155 to 160 Turkish liras last month. Another factor in the decline of round iron bar prices is the fact that demand for this item has declined considerably because of the season."

Meanwhile, Abdulkadir Kusin, a member of the Iron Steel Professional Committee of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, described the abrupt decision of the pig iron producers to cut prices overnight as a major success for imports and said that the goal of freeing imports was to reduce prices. Stating that any size of steel bars can now be purchased on market, Kusin contended that steel prices will be able rise by only 1 to 2 Turkish liras a week and that there will no longer be any abnormal price hikes as before.

Meanwhile, Nuri Colakoglu, Chairman of the Board of the Colakoglu Metallurgy Corporation, pointed out that in countries from which steel is being imported steel producers receive government subsidies ranging from 50 to 70 percent and

said that his firm has cut prices to halt imports. Noting that the freeing of steel imports with only 1 percent customs duty has begun to hurt the iron and steel industry in Turkey, Colakoglu said:

"The steel that is being imported following the freeing of imports is subsidized by 50 to 70 percent. Moreover, the government's decision to reduce the customs duty on these imports to 1 percent has given rise to unfair competition in the domestic market. In response, we, the private sector iron and steel producers, decided to cut pig iron prices by 15 Turkish liras per kilogram. We thus reduced pig iron prices from 120,000 Turkish liras per metric ton to 107,500 Turkish liras per metric ton. Today, the Colakoglu and the Cukurova corporations are charging the same prices for pig iron in the market."

Stating that although prices have been cut the delivery of steel imports for which contracts have been signed will continue, Colakoglu said that so far they have failed to score any success against imports. Noting that it is exports that are keeping the iron and steel market alive, Colakoglu said: "Turkey's steel production is much higher than the needs of the domestic market. In view of the fact that demand in the domestic market will grow substantially when factories begin operating at full capacity, exports are seen as the only way to resolve this situation."

Meanwhile, Sami Sari, the leader of the Turkish Building Contractor Employers' Union, said that price cuts in the iron and steel market will not mean the revitalization of the construction sector and that a number of radical measures must be taken to revive the construction sector. Sari added: "Iron and steel prices have been cut to trim stocks and to alleviate the cash flow problem."

Noting that the recent increase in pig iron imports has also been a factor in the drop in prices in the iron and steel market, Sari said:

"However, the low prices observed in the iron and steel market recently is not a deep-rooted and permanent situation; the prices have dropped only temporarily. Indeed, the Turkish Iron and Steel Works Directorate General has not cut its prices. What has happened is that private sector iron and steel dealers who were selling their products in the black market at prices higher than those of the Turkish Iron and Steel Works cut their prices at the end of the construction season with an eye to trimming their stocks and to alleviate their cash shortage problems. Their goal is to sell their stocks quickly to alleviate their cash shortage problem."

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PORTUGUESE TANKERS RETURN TO IRAN

Lisbon A TRADE in Portuguese 22 Oct 84 p 15

[Excerpt] Portugal's recent decision to go back to buying oil from Iran is justified by the fact that Iranian crude is cheaper by 15 to 20 percent than that of other producers. Since Portugal needs 8 to 9 million tons of crude oil it will save 50 million contos if it buys all of it from Iran.

The Soponata ship "Marofa" left last week for the Persian Gulf "without making clear whether it is going to Kharg Island," said a spokesperson for the company.

"There are several cargos to pick up in the Gulf during this quarter, and the exact port where the pickups are to be made depends on contracts signed by Petrogal, which are not always known to Soponata by sailing date," added Maria Aires, Soponata's director of operations and planning.

The Soponata official declared, "Contrary to news reports in Lisbon, the supertanker "Neiva" has already put in at Kharg this year to take on crude for Petrogal's refinery in Sines."

As to whether the ships "Marao" and "Ortis Bettencourt," which are currently headed toward Lisbon, might go on later to Kharg, Maria Aires stated "we still don't know the routes, but even if they're toward the Gulf, nothing indicates that that means Kharg."

"It would be an exaggeration to use all this capacity, which is a substantial part of our shipping capacity, just in one port, and especially Kharg," she added.

Crew Insurance up From 5 to 15 Thousand Contos

Each crew member has been insured for 15,000 contos because of the high risk of this voyage. The tanker "Marofa" is also covered by insurance for a large amount, with Iran obliged to pay the premiums for such insurance.

"Soponata has a contract for carrying barrels, marketed by Petrogal, and the routing of its ships, in large part, follows the contracts worked out by the refining company and which are practically always made at the last minute, said Maria Leonor Aires.

Regarding the option for taking on oil at Kharg, because of the lower selling price, the Soponata official said that she was "not acquainted with the risks, since the contracts are signed by Petrogal."

As to the increase in life insurance for ships' crews in the vicinity of Kharg from 5 to 15 thousand contos, Maria Leonor stated that "there are contract provisions allowing for subsidy increases for areas throughout the Gulf region, corresponding in some cases to 100 percent of salary figures.

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CSO: 3542/036

ENERGY

PORUGAL

BRIEFS

OIL EXPLORATION SIGNED--A contract was signed today in the Ministry of Industry and Energy with Geophysical Service (GSI) to carry out a geophysical prospecting campaign (seismic, magnetic, and gravimetric) over an extension of 4,500 kms, to last two to three months. This is a first step in the strategy that the Office for Petroleum Exploration and Exploration (GPEP) has adopted since the beginning of the year toward revitalizing such exploration in Portugal by specialized foreign companies. The prospecting will be carried out under a plan drawn up by GPEP in Portuguese offshore areas extending from the Porto parallel to the Portimao meridian, using a seismic ship carrying the most sophisticated equipment. Data obtained will be analyzed later in Bedford. The work is of a nonexclusive nature and will be carried out without any obligations to the Portuguese state. Marketing of the final product, which is aimed to attract the petroleum companies, will be up to GSI and GPEP, under arrangements providing for reimbursement of costs incurred in carrying out the work, and then for Portugal and GSI to share equally in the marketing results for the duration of the contract, after which any eventual continuing profits will revert exclusively to the state. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Oct 84 p 5] 12430

CSO: 3542/036

ENERGY

TURKEY

OIL COMPANIES REDUCE PETROLEUM PRODUCTION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 23 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] Ankara--Domestic crude oil production by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation, the Ersan Corporation, Turkse Shell and Mobil has begun to decline. The total crude oil production of the said firms in 1984 is expected to be 6 percent less than last year's production.

According to the projections of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, domestic crude oil production will reach 2,069,800 metric tons by the end of this year. This amount 6.1 percent less than last year's output of 2,203,400 metric tons.

It is estimated that the crude oil production of Turkse Shell, which is one of the largest producers by Turkish standards, will decline by 14.4 percent compared to last year. While the Turkish Petroleum Corporation is expected to reduce its production by 2.2 percent, Mobil's output is expected to rise by 12.4 percent.

By the end of 1984, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation is expected to produce 947,800 metric tons of crude, Turkse Shell is expected to produce 840,800 metric tons while Mobil will try to attain its production target of 280,000 metric tons.

The Ersan Corporation is the smallest oil producer in the country. Ersan produced 3,200 metric tons of oil in 1983. This year its production is expected to decline by 69.9 percent to about 1,000 metric tons.

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